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1985 
ABSTRACT 
The epistemological problem that I shall investigate in this 
thesis is the separation of the knowing subject from the object that 
is known. Generally, _this problem is called "the subject-object 
dichotomy." Traditionally only the mind bas been considered as the 
knower, while the body has been thought of merely as a passive 
vehicle of data. Thus one has been left with the mind separated from 
the body and from the objects of knowledge E,I_ the body. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a contemporary French phenomenologist, 
has sought to overcome the separation between the knower and the 
known by understanding the body as a crucial dimen~ion of the active 
knower. The purpose of this present study is to examine whether and 
how Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body can be said to eliminate 
the subject-object dichotomy. 
In the first chapter, I explicate Merleau-Ponty's philoso phy of 
embodiment, including his critique of traditional theories of 
perception, as well as nis exploration of the importance of the body 
and the role of language to the act of knowing. In the second 
chapter, I trace the application of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to 
epistemology, giving special attention to our knowledge of the world, 
other persons, and ourselves. I conclude that the epistemic gap 
between the knower and the known can be overcome, along the lines 
proposed by Merleau-Ponty, by viewing the body at the outset as an 
intentional, active knower. 
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The epistemological problem that I shall investigate in this 
thesis is the separation of the knowing subject from the object that 
• L-- l 1.s a.uown. Generally this problem is called the "subject-object 
dichotomy." In traditional epiatemologies, for example those of 
Plato, Descartes, Locke and Kant, the knowing subject is presumed to 
be the mind alone. Even empiricists, who claim that we attain 
knowledge through the senses, understand the senses as mere vehicles 
of data which are known with the mind. Thus the body is not 
considered as an active knower, or for that matter as a part of the 
knower at all. One is then left, first with the mind separated from 
the body, and further with the mind separated from the objects to be 
known. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), a contemporary French 
phenomenolgist, has sought to overcome the distance between the 
knower and the known. lt should perhaps be noted at the outset that 
nerleau-Ponty never finished his epistemology. At the time of his 
death he was working on a manuscript, which was originally entitled 
The Origin of Truth, that was eventually published under the title 
The Visible and the Invisible. There is, however, ample material in 
his earlier works from which to work toward a fresh approach to 
epistemological questions, especially that of the subject-object 
dichotomy. Naturally what follows is only a suggestion concerning 
the application of Merl eau-Ponty's philosophy of the body to this 
question of the "epistemic gap" between the knower and the known. 
The epistemic distance between the knower and the known may 
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perhaps be overcome by viewing the body as a point of intersection or 
overlap between the subject and the object of knowledge. In order 
for the body to serve as a .connection between these two terms of the 
knowing relationship, it must be thought of as an active and 
essential dimension of the knowing subject, rather than as an object 
among other objects in the world. For kerleau-Ponty the body is 
construed as a body-subject, a meaning-seeking, intentional being. 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty has sought to redefine the nature of 
the relationship between the knower and the known on the basis of 
this distinctive understanding of the role of the body in knowledge. 
The terms he uses to characterize this fresh view of the above 
relationship suggest an interactive relationship of interdependence 
and symbiosis. He employs such descriptions as: "r eciprocal," 
"dialogical," "inter-subjective," "lived," "inhabited," 
"communication," "co111D1union,11 and "coition.' _12 Such descriptions 
clearly suggest an active, two-way relationship which const r asts 
strongly with the passive, one-directional character of the 
relationship between the knower and the known in traditional 
epistemolo~ies. 
Perhaps the dynamics comprising an electromagnetic force-field 
might serve as a helpful analogy here. The positive and negative 
poles wi t hin such a force-field only have existence and significance 
in relation to each other. When either of these poles ceases to 
exist, so does the other. Although either of the poles can be 
subjected to extensive analysis in and of itself in the abstract, it 
can never be isolated nor understood apart from the other pole. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that there a~e ~ poles, each with 
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a distinct identity and character; they are never absorbed into each 
other. So it is with the relationship between the knower and the 
known in Merleau-Pon t y's epistemology. Although each gets its 
identity and significance in relation to the other, they are not the 
same entity. Rather, they are !.!2, interdependent poles of one 
reality. 
The focus of this study, then, is the subject-object dichotomy 
of traditional epistemology and Merleau-Ponty's effort to overcome 
it. What I hope to show is that one can overcome this dichotomy by, 
and perhaps only by, taking the body of the knower seriously as a 
know~ng subject and not merely as an object among other objects. The 
epistemic gap between t~e knower and the known is bridged by 
interpreting the body as the axis around which the dynamic of knowing 
pivots, as the intersection wherein the knowing subject and the known 
object meet. 
Merleau-Ponty was an author of a wide variety of works in 
phenomenology, socio-political philosophy, aesthetics, and 
psychology. The main attention of this present study will be given 
to his early major work, Phenomenology.£!. Perception (written in 
1945), in which he developed his philosophy of embodiment. The 
following additional texts will also be used: ~ Primacy of 
Perception (a collection of essays written over a period of years), 
Sense and Non-Sense (1948), Signs (1960), Prose of the World (1961), 
and The Visible~ the Invisible (1961). The principal secondary 
literature includes the most recent American commentators on 
kerleau-Ponty's philosophy, especially on the role of the body in his 
work. The main interpreters are: Mary Rose Barral, John F. Bannan, 




1. The aspect of epistemology under consideration here does not 
pertain to questions of truth, justification or beliet. Its 
focus is on the knowing process itself at the experiential, 
first-order level. 
2. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ot Perception, tr. Colin 
~mith (New York: RW11anities Press, 1962), pp. lb5, 354, 352, 
304, 311 and 320, - respectively. 
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Chapter One 
Merle au-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment 
First of all, it is important to begin with an outline of 
Merleau-Ponty's criticism of both empiricism and rationalism, as well 
as of Kant's epistemology. These three approaches to the problem of 
the relationship between the subject and the object form the 
background against which Merleau-Ponty writes, and it is the 
difficulties of these traditions that the philosophy of embodiment 
aims to clarify and resolve. l will begin by trac i ng Merleau - Ponty's 
critique of these accounts of perceptual knowledge and then move on 
to a treatment of his own account in terms of the body as a 
perceptual system, including his philosophy of language. 
l. A Critique of Traditional Theories of Perception 
The main problem with traditional empiricism, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, is that it does not take into account the structure of 
perception as it actually occurs. Empiricism treats experience as 
made up of sensory units and thereby reduces perception into 
separate, "atomistic blocks," which is both confusing and inaccurate. 
Pure sensation wi'll be the experience of an 
undi ff erentia t ed instantaneous, dotlike impact. It is 
unnecessary to show, since authors are agreed on it, that 
this notion corresponds to nothing in our experience, and 
that the most rudimentary factual perceptions that we are 
acquainted with, in creatures such as the ape and the hen, 
have a 1bearing on relationships and not on any absolute terms. 
Traditional empiricism does not take into ·account that we 
experience sensations, not as isolated units, but always as parts of 
a whole. We do not have 11·pure sensations" but, rather, experiences 
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1n relationa.hip to other experiences. "The perceptual 'something' is 
always 1n the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 
If. 1 · 1 112 1e Cl • l'hus, we do not have a sensation of redness or coldness 
1n isolation, without a context, but we might see a red ball on a 
white table or we might feel cold because we are inadequately 
dressed. Although even empiricists acknowledge that if perception is 
reduced to these "undifferentiated, instantaneous, dotlike 11 
sensations, one cannot account for knowledge, their concept of t~e 
mind as a passive receiver of data provides no way to get beyond 
meaningless sensory bombardment. For the empiricist view of mind, as 
a tabula..!:!!!_ onto which impressions of redness, squareness and 
smoothness are drawn, involves . no dynamic by means of which we pull 
individual sensations together into meaningful wholes. 
Empiricism tries to deal with this difficulty, and thereby 
account for the possibility of integrated experience and knowledge by 
introducing the concept of "association." Mere association of 
impressions, however, does not account for how a cluster of 
impressions becomes a meaningful or significant object of knowledge. 
The mere grouping of sensations does not cause my min<l to apprehend 
the object of perception.!!. a unified whole; my mind would then 
merely record a group of individual sensa t ions. How a mind groups or 
associates sensations, and which sensations i t clusters toge t her, and 
why are the crucial epistemological questions · which empiricism f ails 
to answer. In fact these questions do not even arise within Merleau-
Pooty's approach. As he himself says: 
the significance of the percept, far from resulting from 
an association, is in fact presupposed in all associat i on, 
whether it concerns the perception of a fi§ure before one, 
or the recollection of former experiences. 
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If we confine ourselves to phenomena, the unity _ of the 
thing in perc eption is not arriv ed at by association, but 
is a conditio n of association, and as such precedes the 
deiimitation s whach establish and verify it, and indeed 
precedes itself. 
The significance and unity of an object of knowledge, then, is 
not drawn onto a "bl an k tablet " of the mind by the sensations , but 
in the phencmena l flow of experience an object is perceived.!! 
meaningful. The mind cannot be merely a passive recei er, even of 
associated perceptions. There is something in the knowing subject, 
or more properly in the relationship between the knower and the 
known, which selects and organizes the percepts into meaningful 
wholes. This is not in the Kantian sense of static categories of the 
understanding, but rather in the relational sense, wherein the 
percepts are experienced.!! meaningful at the outset. The basic 
problem that Merleau-Ponty sees with empiricism is that it 
understands experience as comprised of atomistic sensations, 
associated clusters of impressions. As such, empiricism cannot 
account for knowledge because any significance that the knower 
experiences in relation to the known object is not part of the 
sensations themselves, and thus goes unaccounted for. Some of the 
problematic implications which Merleau-Ponty sees folloiwng from 
empiricism's separation of experience into atomistic sensations need 
to be mentioned. To begin with, the "cultural world," or the "human 
world" as Merleau-Ponty calls it, is not allowed for in empiricism. 
F'pr most of us Nature is no more than a vague and remote 
entity, overlaid by cities, roads, houses and above all by 
the presence of other people. Now, for empiricism, 
"cultural" objects and faces owe their distinctive form, 
their magic power, to transference and projection of 
memo~y, 30 only by accident has the human world any 
meaning. 
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According to Merleau-Ponty, empiricists fail to note that we, in 
fact, perceive anger or pain in a face rather than remember the time 
when we too were feeling angry or hurt and had such a look on our 
face, etc. Merleau-Ponty objects to the idea that a meaning which we 
discern in a closed fist, for example, is inferred from introspection 
and memory, which is the only way empiricism can account for such 
significance. Instead, he claims that fear, anger, joy and the like 
are embodied in the look, in the shape of the eyebrows, mouth, etc. 
We do not infer the meaning of such expressions, we experience it 
"pre-critically," as it were. So the cultural or the "human world," 
as a basic given of our existence, is hidden from us by empiricism. 
The "natural world" is also falsified by empiricism, according 
to Merleau-Ponty. As he puts it: 
••• the nature about which empiricism talks is a collection 
of stimuli and qualities, and it is ridiculous to pretend 
that nature thus conceived is, even ig intention, merely 
the primary object of our perception. 
In empiricism, nature or the natural world is said to be experie nced 
as a kind of scientific object. Nature, however, in actual 
experience is not made up of individual data or stimuli. If that 
were the case, our world would be full of gaps and unrelated 
impressions. In life we naturally fill in the gaps, even though we 
may not be receiving stimuli from them. Let me illustrate with an 
example. When we are looking at an object, let it be the tennis 
ball, we only actually see a part of it at any one time and from any 
one angle. Nevertheless, we experience the ball as a fully rounded 
object. Only in rare instances, as in a trick-shop window, for 
instance, might we not "see" the whole ball. As a matter of fact, 
the trick ball, being perhaps only a half-shell, works as a trick 
precisely and only because we initially experience it as a whole 
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ball. Therefore, in the natural world objects are not discovered and 
dealt with as so-c~lled 11scientific 11 objects. A newly born baby 
does not infer from memory that the nurturer's face is not a 
mask-like facade, but experiences it as a face full of meaning rather 
h . 1 · 7 t an stimu i. 
Merleau-Ponty makes the same point in relation to the 11hidden 11 
background in a paintin&, : . 
The phenomenon pf the background's continuing under the 
figure, and being seen upder _ the figure - when in fact it 
is covered by the · figure - ~ phenomenon which embraces the 
whole problem of the presence of the object, is equally 
obscured by empiricism, whicg treats this covered part of 
the background ,s inyisible. 
Therefore, our experience of our natural world is not made up on 
stimuli-like se~sations, since we do in fact often perceive things 
from which we are not receiving any data. In Merleau-Ponty's words: 
The hysterical child who turps around 'to see if the 
world behind him is still there' (Schaler, Idole der 
Selbsterkenntnis, p. 85) suffers from no deficiency of 
images, but the perceived world has lost for him that 
original structure that ensures that for the normal person 
its h~dden aspects are as indubitable as are its visible 
ones. 
Mary Rose Barral summarizes Merleau-Pon t y's critique of 
empiricism very well in the following paragraph: 
-
••• empiricism is a prolongation of the naive, realistic 
approach to reality, a sort of systematization of that 
external reality which the common man asserts, with which 
one communicates only through the senses, exteriorly ••• the 
world is a reality in itself, ruled by certain laws, having 
certain properties independent of the subject experiencing 
it ••• to empiricism the fundamental element for the 
description of the phenomena is lacking: that of the in-
diss~luable_unioy0between subject and the world from which 
meaning derives. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, empiricism is not the only 
epistemological tradition which has crucial difficulties. 
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Rationalism, or what be calls "intellectualism," is also seen as 
wrong-headed. Re puts it this way: 
Both emp1r1c1sm and rationalism take the objective world 
as the object of their analysis, when this comes first 
neither in time nor in virtue of its meaning; and both are 
incapable of expressing the peculiar . way in which the 
perceptual consciousness constitutes its object. Both keep 
their distance in relatiyn to perception, instead of 
sticking cl~sely to it. 
Neither empiricism nor rationalism_ takes the actual structure of 
perception seriously enough. Both keep it at a distance, as an 
"objective" transaction. kationalism, in fact, does not take 
perception seriously at all, because for it all objects of knowledge 
are in the mind as ideas. For some rationalists, like Plato, sense 
perception serves only as an occasion for the "recollection" of 
pre-existent knowledge o_f eternal ideas. Consider, for example, the 
slave boy in the~. whose recollection of geometrical truth was 
merely triggered by Socrates' questions and figures drawn in the 
sand. 
The main problem with rationalism, accord i ng to Merleau-Ponty, 
is this very pre-existence of knowledge, whether in the world of 
"Forms" or simply in Cartesian innate ideas. The intellectualist 
views the mind as "over-enriched," whereas the empiricist viewed it 
as empty or "under-enriched." Merleau-Ponty puts it in the following 
manner: 
Where empir Lcism was deficient was in any connection 
between the object and the act which it triggers otf. What 
intellectualism lacks is contingency in the occasions of 
thought. In the first case consciousness is too poor, in 
the second too rich for any phenomenon to appear compelling 
to it. Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we 
are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking fo r 1t, 
and int e llectualism fails to see that we need to be 
ignorant of wha t Y2 are looking for, or equally we should 
not be searching. 
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Thus, even the intellectualist must search for knowledge. In 
addition, if the basic objects of knowledge are in the mind as innate 
l or pre-existent ideas, there ought to be no possibility of error. 
However, since our claims to knowledge are not incorrigible, there 
must be something missing from the rationalist account. Discovery 
and error, then, become the chief stumbling blocks for an 
intellectualist account of human knowledge. As Mallin writes: 
••• this ego cannot make mistakes or be fpoled by illusions 
or falsehoods, for its experiences have the clarity of 
ioeas and can thus be exhaustively thematized and grasped 
by means of cognitive categories. Merleau-Ponty frequently 
criticizes this theory both because it makes illusion and 
error impossible, and thus equates appearance and 
reality, and because there is nothing in our experience 
that correfyonds to such immanent, apodictic, or "absolute 
evidence. 11 
If empiricism fails, according to Merleau-Ponty, because it does 
not leave room for any reflection about our sensations, merely 
associating them as they come, intellectualism fails because its 
reflections are devoid of any sensations. Merleau-Ponty seems to 
agree with Kant when it comes to empiricism and rationalism; one is 
blind because its "percepts" have no guiding reflection and the other 
1s empty because its "concepts" have nothing on which to reflect. 
Another problem, according to Merleau-Ponty, with both 
empiricism and rationalism lies 1n their relationship to the object 
of knowledge, more sp ecifically in the production of that which is 
known. As he himself states it: 
••• the two doctrines, then, have this idea in common that 
attention creates nothing, since a world of impressions in 
itself or a universe of determininf 4 thought are equal~y independent of the action of mind. 
Although at first it would seem that intellectualism could not be 
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guilty of considering the mind as merely passive, since the objects 
of thought are innately in the mind and are therefore known by the 
mind itself, the mind is not, in Merleau-Ponty's view, actively 
involved with the ideas. The attention of the mind is more like a 
search light which passively shines upon anything that falls in its 
predetermined path. The light of the mind, according to 
intellectualism, cannot stop and consider a given object of thought, 
or go back to a , pr evious one out of interest . Attention thus 
understood cannot discriminate and choose among its objects. 
Consciousness is no less intimately linked with objects of 
which it is unheeding than with those which interest it, 
and the additional clearness brought by the act of 
attention does not herald any new relationship. It 
therefore becomes once more a light which does not change 
its chaiscter with the various objects which it shines 
upon ••• 
In intellectualism, 'judgment' is brought in to make perception 
possible. Perception is not possible on the basis of sensations 
alone, since one needs something with which to interpret the stimuli. 
As Descartes said when he looked out the window on the people walking 
along with hats on their heads: " ••• what do I see from the window, 
except hats and coats which may cover ghosts or dummies worked by 
16 springs? Yet I judge them to be real men." In the same way, 
according to the intellectualist perspective, when we see a stick 
half submerged in water, it looks bent but we judge it to be 
straight. Thus, what we perceive often differs from how we judge it. 
Perception ends where judgment begins. It is with this poi nt t hat 
Merleau-Ponty disagrees. 
. p 
The result is t hat intellectualist analysis eventually 
makes nonsense of the perceptual phenomena which it is 
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designed to elucidate. While judgment loses ita 
constitutive function and becomes an explanatory principle, 
the words 'see,' 'hear,' and 'feel' lost all their meaning, 
since the least significant vision outruns the pure 
impression f~d thus comes under the general heading of 
'Judgment.' _ 
Merleau-Ponty maintains that perception and judgment are very 
intimat el y connected. With respect to the stick which is set to look 
bent in water, actually we experience the stick as being straight 
because we have no other sense perceptions of it that guide us in 
1 . h . 1 . . 18 pacing t e sensation we are present y receiving. Thus a 
combination of sensations enables us to judge in a certain way. 
Judgment is, therefore, not separate from perception, but is a 
dimension of it. Our intellectual capacities do not, after all, 
arise out of or take place within a vacuum. Intellectualism fails to 
acknowle dge that reflection grows out of a world which is "already 
there." Sallis states this point in the following fashion: 
The philosophy of reflection fails to take account of our 
"natural bond" with the world, of that intrinsically opaque 
link to thing which is already established when reflection 
comes upon the scene ••• ~hat is required is a reflecti on 
which proceeds in full recognition of the tact that it 
takes pla ce only within the compasf
9
of an always already 
constituted presence to the world. 
In spite of the fact that Immanuel Kant's epistemology was 
of fe red and is often taken as a way of overcoming the 
empiricist-rational i st standoff, from Merleau-Ponty' s perspective it, 
too, fails to resolve the difficulties inherent in the subject-object 
dichotomy. Mind, in Kant's view, although equipped with the 
intuitions of space and time which organ i ze the sensory manifold of 
experience, and the categories of the understanding which stru ct ure 
our conceptual experience, still functions in an essentially passive 
manner. For Kant the knowing subject is not actively seeking 
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knowledge, is not searching. Space, time, and causation, along with 
the other aspects of our cognitive scaffolding, remain abstract 
concepts rather than functioning relationally and inter-
dependently with the known. Kant tails to pay attention to the act 
or process of knowing itself. Even a synthesis of empiricism and 
rationalism fail _s to "attach due importance to that circumscribed 
ignorance, that still empty but already determinate intention which 
is attention itse1t. 1120 
In his Critique E.f ~ Reason Kant attempted to bring the 
knowing mind and the known world closer together than they had been 
in either empiricism or rationalism. Nevertheless, Kant's subject is 
not in a constructive relationship with the object of knowledge. As 
Merleau-Ponty says: "Kant detached the subject, or consciousness, by 
showing that I could not possibly apprehend anything as existing 
unless I first of all experienced myself as existing in the act of 
apprehending it. 1121 Furthermore, the world for Mer~eau-Ponty is 
"always already there," it is "lived," while for Kant it is not. 
Kant tried to bring the subject and object of knowledge into a clo s er 
relationship, but only succeeded in unify i ng t he subject with in 
itself. Merleau-Ponty writes: . 
What distinguishes intentionali ty f r om the Kant ian relation 
to a possible object is that th e unit y of the world ••• is 
lived as ready-made or already made. Kant himself shows i n 
the Critique£!. Judgment that there exists a unity of the 
imagination and the 22derstanding and a uni t y of subje c ts 
before the object .•• 
A distance remains between the kno~er and the known in Kant's 
epistemology, especially as found in his first Critique, since the 
kno~n object is regarded as independently real. In other words, it 
is understood as existing on its own prior to its involvement with 
14 
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the knowing subject. The object, as a thing-in-itself, has reality 
and identity completely outsiae ot a relationship with any subject. 
Therefore, the two, the world and the subject are separated and the 
possibility, indeed, the necessity, of a dichotomy remains. As 
Mallin remarks: 
' Although Kant gives us a better understanding of the unity 
of the subje c t and the world by making the function of 
subjectivity transcendental, both he and liusserl are also 
criticized for taking as r2al the multiplicity that is 
outside the consciousness. 3 
We shall see later on that in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in 
general, and in his epis t emology in particular, "relationality" is 
the crucial notion. The knower and the known get their identity and 
reality from each other. That is to say, each is ~hat it is because 
of its relationship to the other. This is the reason that 
Merleau-Ponty is critical of Kant's assumption that the noumenal 
world, which exists independently of a perceiving or knowing subject, 
can be conceived of as independently real. If this were the case, 
the thing-in-itself could not be conceived of at all. 
In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty is dissatisfied with the empiricism 
because it does not leave room for any critical reflection with 
respect to the clustering of sense data, and he is dissatisfied with 
rationalism because it leaves no room for anything other than such 
reflection. Nor does intellectualism allow for our pre-reflective 
awareness of the world as lived and already there. Kant, in turn, is 
criticized by Merleau-Ponty for not taking into account the world as 
primordial to all analysis. In addition, he is chastized for tailing 
to provide a true synthesis of empiricism and intellectualism. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Kant cannot regard the noumena as 
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independently real and at the same time claim to have bridged the gap 
between the knower and the known. By maintaining the former he 
undercuts the latter. 
The main difficulty, then, with all of these traditional 
epistemologies is their failure to posit or arrive at an 
inter-dependent relationship between the knower and the known 
predicated on a view of the knowing subject as active. In 
Merleau-Ponty's epistemology, however, the knowing subject is an 
active, intentional, meaning-seeking body. Let us now look more 
closely at the role ot the body in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, with 
an eye to seeing how it claims to overcome the epistemic gap between 
the knower and the known. 
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2. A Philosophy of the Body 
There are five main points in Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the 
role of the body which seem to me to pertain directly to the t opic of 
the subject-object dichotomy in epistemology. They are: (l) the 
body as an object in the world, (2) the body as a subject, (3) the 
spatiality and (4) the motility of one's own body, and (5 ) the 
synthesis of one's own body. 
(l) At one point Merleau-Ponty focuses the prevailing view of 
the body i n the foll owing fashion: 
The definition of the object is ... that it exists partes 
extra partes, and that consequently it acknowledges between 
its parts, or between itself and other 2~bjects, only external and mechanical relationships. 
This is how modern physiology understands our bodies. It has a very 
mechan i stic view, regarding the human body as simply another, though 
highl y complex machine. As far as mechanistic physiology is 
concerned, a person losing a part of her body is comparable to a car, 
for example, losing a tire. A person without a leg is simply that, 
an object without one of its parts. However, as Merleau-Ponty points 
out, there is a phenomenon called the "phantom-leg syndrome. 11 In 
certain instances a person who has lost a leg nevertheless continues 
to experience the non-existent leg. I have a friend who lost both of 
his legs in the Finno-Russo war and now has artificial legs. 
According to a mechanistic physiology, he ought not now have any 
sen s ation in his legs because they are not there. however, he often 
gets, for example, an itch on his knee; that is to say, his 
non-existent knee itches. This feelin& in a phantom limb is not 
explainable according to a mechanistic model of the human body, 
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because we ought not feel things in limbs which do not exist. 
This feeling in a phantom limb cannot be explained on the basis 
of a simple stimulus-response mechanism, since there are no nerve 
impulses coming to the brain from the leg in question. Therefore, 
the brain itself is a far deeper organic entity than a purely 
psychological model will allow. At the opposite extreme, 
Merleau-Ponty gives the example of someone being stimulated but 
ceasing to have a sensation of it. A person's skin may be repeatedly 
touched by a hair, for example, until the localization becomes less 
and less precise and the hair is felt as touching a much broader 
area. Then the feeling is experienced as alternatively hot and cold. 
Later the person thinks the stimulus is being moved around and 
finally nothing at all is felt. 25 Such examples seem to indicate 
that there are instances in which the body does not function in a 
strictly mechanistic manner. Certain stimuli do not always create a 
specific brain sensation and, vice versa, sometimes sensations are 
felt without the corresponding stimulus. 
Naturally, now, one is led to think that if a mechanistic 
physiology cannot explain the phantom limb phenomenon, perhaps a 
purely mentalistic psychology ought to be able to do so. Mentalism 
would maintain that a person may experience pains, itches, etc. in a 
lost limb because of an erroneous belief, a memory-image, or simply a 
refusal to accept the loss of a limb. Such explanations are not 
sufficient, however, because if one were to cut the appropriate 
nerves in the brain, the phantom limb experiences would cease. "But 
no psychological explanation can overlook the tact that the severance 
of the nerves to the brain abolishes the phantom limb. 1126 Therefore, 
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Merleau-Ponty concludes that the explanation of the phantom limb 
phenomenon must lie somewhere between, or in a combination of, 
physiology and psychology. 
In order to describe the belief in the phantom limb and the 
unwillingness to accept mutilation, writers speak of a 
'driving into the unconsciousness' or 'organic repression.' 
These un-Ca r tesian terms force us to form the idea of an 
organic thought through which the relation 2f the 'psychic' 
to the 'phy s iological' becomes conceivable. 
The phenomenon of the phantom limb makes clear the uniqueness of 
the human body when one is discussing it as an object in the world. 
It is not altogether like other objects, it is not simply an object 
among other objects. However, as we saw above, it is not exclusively 
a mental entity either. So, the human body is in fact an object, but 
a unique one, in so far as it functions as a living, relational axis 
for human experience. 
It is by abandoning the body as an object partes extra 
partes, and going back to the body which I experience at 
this moment, in the manner, for example, in which my hand 
moves round the object it touches, anticipating the stimuli 
and itself tracing out the form which I am about to 
perceive. I cannot understand the function of the living 
body except by enacting it myself, and ex2§Pt in so far as lam a body which rises toward the world. 
The relationship between the psychical and the physiological in 
the human body is more complex than one might think initially. 
Traditionally the relationship of the soul to the body has been 
regarded quite mechanistically or quite dualistically; what is body 
is not soul and vice versa. As Zaner notes: 
Once one accepts such a dualism, he is faced with the 
insoluble problem of reestablishing the principle of 
connection between these two essentially different 
substances,_and
2
ge must either reduce mind to matter, or 
matter to mind. 
As a result of this separation the functions of each dimension of 
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human experience have been separated as well. In either case, with 
respect to knowledge, the role ot the body has been essentially 
ignored, with mechanist& denying the very possibility of knowledge as 
more than the conditioning of a complex machine and dualist& limiting 
knowledge to the mind as separate from the body. In Merleau-Ponty's 
epistemology these views of the human body are both rejected. 
Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an 
organism, but the movement to and fro of existence which at 
one time allows itself to take corporeal form and at others 
moves towards personal acts ••• The union of soul and body _ 
is not an amalgamation between two mutually external t~ 0ms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. 
In his last and unfinished work,~ Visible~.!.!!!_ Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty refers to the relationship between mind and body in the 
following way: 
Define the mind as the other side of the body - we have 
no idea of a mind that would not be doubled with a body, 
that would not be established on this ground - The 'other' 
side means that the body ••• is not describable in 
objective terms, in terms of the in-itself - that this 
other side is really the other side of the body, overflows 
into it (Uberschreiten), encroaches upon it, is hidden in 
it - at the same1time needs it, terminates in it, is anchored in it • .j 
It is clear that in the thou~ht of Merleau-Ponty the body is not 
an object like other objects in the world. Also, the relationship 
between the mind and the body, is not that of separation as in the 
thought of Descartes, for example, but is rather a relationship of 
dimensionality. The one dimension is inextricably intertwined within 
the other in an organic manner. The mind and the body are like two 
poles of a magnetic field; each gets its reality and identity from 
the other. Because the body can never exist apart from the mind, it 
can never be thought of as an object among other objects in the 
world. 
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another object in the world is that of the body as subject. Each 
person experiences his or her own body differently from other bodies 
and/or objects in the world. This uniqueness of the body as subject 
is crucial to an understanding of the relationship between the knower 
and the known. Moreover, as will be pointed out later on in this 
study, our knowledge of ourselves as embodied subjects is for 
Merleau-Ponty the paradigm case for knowing in general. Let us begin 
by examining a person's relationship to their own body more closely; 
what are the aspects that make it unique and so very important 
epistemologically? 
First of all, one can never get away from one's own body. There 
is a certain kind of permanence of my body. Barral says this about 
it: "The body is therefore not as any other object, but one which 
has the particularity of being always available to me - always 
present. Its permanency 1s absolute inasmuch as it serves as a 
foundation for the relative permanence of objects. 1132 I can walk 
away from every other object in the entire world, but not from my own 
body, thus it is questionable whether one's own body can be called an 
"object" at all. In fact, "walking away" entails a body in/w i th 
~l 
oneself or in front of oneself to look at one's self from a fresh 
angle. We normally experience ourselves, as well as the world, 
vectorially or from the "inside out," as it were. 
A dualist might object at this point and s_ay that one "steps 
back" from oneself quite frequently, as when we observe ourselves 
behaving or thinking about our own thoughts. The problem with this 
objection is that it fails to acknowledge that even such acts of 
so-called "self-transcendence" are predicated on the unity of the 
self which is performing these acts. It is the full self, not just 
the mind, which intends and engages the world, even when one is 
involved in self-reflection. The mistake here is similar to that of 
concluding that since either pole of a magnetic field can be 
designated independently of the other, each can exist apart from the 
other. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
For Merleau-Ponty the body is the axis from which I experience 
other bodies. The permanence of my body "is not a permanence in the 
l b f . f . ..34 word, ut a permanence rom my point o view. I cannot have more 
than one point of view at any one moment because my kinaesthetic 
perspective stems from my position in the world. This perspective is 
dependent on where my body is, where I am. My body, in other words, 
is always the vantage point from which l experience others and the 
world. "Here" is always where my body is and I am always "here." 
Another aspect of the uniqueness of my experience of my own body 
has to do with what Merleau-Ponty calls "double sensations." I have 
a double sensation, for example, when l touch myself. When l press 
at the same time both of my hands are subjects and objects of 
touching. Each hand is at once both touching and being touched. 
(The same can perhaps be said about seeing if I am looking at myself 
in a mirror, or when looking into the eyes of another person. I can 
be said to be seeing and to be seen si~ultaneously.) This is now 
Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter 
of two sensations felt together as one perceives two 
objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set - up 
in which both hands can alternate the roles of 'touching' 
and being 'touched' ••• I can identify the hand tou~ged 
as the same one which will in a moment be touching. 
I think Merleau-Ponty's language is a bit too loose when he says 
that the "hands ••• alternate the roles of 'touching' and being 
'touched. 111 It seems to me that, although I can alternate the focus 
of my attention from one hand being the subject and the other being 
the object, neither one of them can absolutely become the subject and 
cease being the object of touching, since if this were possible the 
"object" hand would become just another object in the world, along 
with others. This is precisely what, according to Merleau-Ponty, a 
human body cannot be and remain a human body. lhis is the very point 
of the phenomenon of double sensation. Therefore, perhaps it would 
be most helpful for the making of an overall point to stress the 
simutlaneous character of the act of touching ourselves, . without 
reducing the subject to the object or vice versa. 
Next, my body is said to be "an affective object, whereas 
36 external things are from my point of view merely represented." 
What is meant by this is that if I, for example, have a headache , it 
means that my head hurts, without my head being the cause, as it 
were, of my pain. 
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Fot if I say that my foot hurts, I do not simply mean that 
it is a cause of pain in the same way as the nail, which 
is cu~~ing into it, differing only in being nearer to 
me ••• 
Having a pain in my head or my foot could be explained by relating it 
to the foregoing discussion of double sensations. In a somewhat 
similar way as my hands are touching and being touched at the same 
time, when they are touching each other, also my head or foot is 
affecting pain and is affected by pain at the same time. 
A final unique characteristic of experiencing my body as subject 
has to do with what are called "k.ioaesthe ·t ic sensations. 11 This 
phenomenon could perhaps be referred to as the "sixth sense," 1..e. 
the sense of movement. I move my body aifferently from how I move 
other things with my body. I raise my arm directly, I do not raise 
it by means of something el se. My body, again, is at the same time 
both the subject and the object of my movement. If I move this pen 
on this paper with my hand, I can distinguish the obj ect of movement, 
the pen, from the subject of movement, me, because they are separate 
from each other. Thi s is ' not possible with respect to the movement 
of my han d i t self, however, because here the subject and object are 
one . One coul d perhaps say that in this latter instance there is no 
object of movement, but it still makes sense t o say that my han d is 
moving. 
I move external objects with the aid of my boay, which 
takes hold of them in one place and shif t s them to another. 
But my body itself I move directly, I do not find it at one 
point of objective space and transfe r i t to another, I have 
no need to look for it, it is alr eaa y ,wi t h me -- I do not 
need to lead it towards the movement' s complet i on, it is in 
contact with it from the start and pr ope l s i tself towards 
an en<i. l'he relation~hip bet~gen my decisi on and my body 
are, in movement, magic ones. 
As these four above characteristics illust r ate, my experience of 
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my body is quite different from my experience of other bodies. The 
permanence of my body, the phenomenon of double sensations, my body as 
an affective object, and kinaesthetic sensations all make it clear 
that my relationship to my own body is unique. In fact, one might 
argue that this relationship is so different from any other 
relationship that it should not be called a relationship at all. For 
in a relationship commonly so called, at least two entities are 
necessary, but I and my body are really only one, and significantly 
so. 
(3) Let us now move on to the third major aspect ot Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy of the body and its bearing on the relationship of 
the knower to the known. This aspect pertains to the spatiality of 
one's own body, to its locality or "-whereness." The "-where" of my 
body is clearly different from that of any other thing in the world. 
If my arm is resting on the table I should never think 
of saying that it is beside the ashtray
3
~n the same way 
as the ashtray is beside the telephone. 
The image one gets from the expression "My ai:·m is beside the ashtray" 
is one of an artificial arm , an object among other objects. The 
location of a real, organic arm need not, indeed cannot, be given in 
the above way, because a person knows where his or her arm is in 
relation to one's own body, to oneself, from the "inside," so to 
speak. "I am in undivided possession of [my body] and I know where 
each of my limbs is through a body image in which a ll are included. 1140 
This body image may include, in addition to an awar enes s of the 
location of one's limit, an awareness of a limb which is no longer 
present, as we have seen above. 1'his is what Bannan says about the 
body image: 
25 
Merleau-Ponty demonstrated that the parts of' the body 
are not simply "outside of parts" as the traditional 
definition of objective apace would have it, but that 
they mutually imply each other because of their 
integration in a single form. Because of such a form, 
which Merleau-Ponty now refers to as body image, I have 
an undivided possessi~y of the parts of my body, for the 
image envelopes them. 
The unique spatiality of one's own body can perhaps be clarified 
by referring once again to the concept of 11here. 11 There 1.s no such 
thing as an objective "here;" here is always where I am. The 
location of my body defines where "here" is, it is the axis of my 
entire existence and experience. 
The world 'here' applied to my body does not refer to a 
determinate position in relation to other positions or 
to uternal co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active 
body in an o~Ject, the situation of the body in the face 
of its task. 
In other words, with respect to my experience of the world, space 
1.s not an objective, abstract reality or concept. On the contrary, 
space 1.s essentially relational and is known in and through the body. 
The "here" is a space only in relation to me. Also, it is from this 
"here" that other spac e becomes meaningful, 1.n tact becomes real space 
at all. As Bannan notes: " ••• the body has that most objective of all 
characteristics - deployment in space ••• due to the body as 
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subject ••• Just as lam not an object because I am the condition for ~ 
!
I there being objects, so also I am not in space because I am the source 
( 43 of space." 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of the "point-horizon" structure as the 
f d . f - . d 1 · · ,,44 oun cttion o the notion an rea 1.ty ot space. The point is my 
bodily space, it is the here where my body is. The hor i zon, on the 
other hand, is external space, which circumscribes the point. The 
point, the here, is wherever I stand and the horizon is the limit of 
,,..,,,,,, 
my vision and my movement. The point and the horizon then make up _my 
spatial world. Furthermore, as I move and thus the point moves, so 
also moves the horizon. l'herefore, I can never le~ve my "here" and 
can never get to wnere the horizon was, it has moved away and I am 
once again at my point. 
It is difficult to talk about spatiality without talking at the 
same time about motility, as the above discussion clearly illustrates. 
This is especially significant for the subject-object dichotomy, since 
it underlines the inherent relationality of our embodieo existence, 
and hence all of our knowledge as well. 
(4) It . is in space that we move, and space becomes space for us 
as we move. As Merleau-Ponty says: 
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It is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is 
brought into being, and an analysis of one's own movement 
should enable us to arrive at a better understanding of it. 
By considering the body in movement, we can see better how 
it inhabits space ••• because movement is not limited to /\'h,li -t 
submitting passively to space and time, it actively assures 
them, it tak es them up in their basic significance, which 
i~ obs~ured 4~n the commonplaces of establishing s1.tuat1.ons. 
Let us then examine the notion of motility in more detail. In 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy there are two types of movements. These 
are: concrete movement and abstract movement. To a large degree 
these two movements correspond to the two types of space which were 
discussed above. Concrete movement takes place 1.n bodily space, while 
abstract movement happens in external, or perhaps objective space. 
Clearly, for Merleau-Ponty, the latter emerges or is derived from the 
former. ,,,,,,.,,...---
Schneider, a psychiatric patient to whom Merleau-Ponty refers a 
d · l 46 . h l f . goo dea, 1.s a person w o can on y per orm concrete movements 10 
bodily space. He can make no abstract movements, such as pointing to 
a part of his body, with his eyes shut. His condition is called 
"psychic blindness." For Schneider there is no objective space and 
thus he cannot in any way think of his body as an object in the world. 
, 
His body tor him is pure subject. For instance, if Schneider gets an ---
itch on some part of his body, he can find it and scratch it quite 
easily. It, however, he were askeo to point to the spot where he was 
itching, he could not do so. Pointing would necessitate experiencing 
his body as an object in abstract space. Schneider 
does not need to look for the place where he has been stung. 
He finds it straightway, because for him there is no 
question of locating it in relation to axes of co-ordinates 
in objective space, but of reaching with his phenomenal hand 
a certain painful spot of bis phenomenal body, and because 
between the hand as a scratching potentiality and the place 
stung as a spot to be scratched a directly experienced 
relationship is presented in the natural system of one's own 
body. The whole operation takes place in the domain of t~1 
phenomenal; it does not run through the objective world. 
It is possible for us normal people, too, to experience the 
difficulty of regarding our body as an object. Perhaps the following 
exercise will prove helpful: Extend your arms in front of you, cross 
them, and then interlace your fingers. Now, pull your hands close to 
your boay so that you can see your interlac~d fingers. then ask a 
friend to point to one of your fingers without touching it. Now try 
to move the finger which has been pointed to. If, however, your 
friend will touch the finger, you will find that moving the proper 
finger is not difficult at all. 
Schneider, or anyone who can only think of themselves as a 
subject in bodily space, can only perform concrete tasks of touching 
and grasping (greifen) and no abstract tasks of pointing (zeigen). 
Greifen is possible for Schneider not only through his own body, but 
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also with respect to other objects as well. For him, all other 
objects are tools in relation to concrete tasks and not ~omething in 
-- ------
and of themselves. A fork, for instance, is only relevant for 
---- ........ .,,. - -- ,,.. .. ___. ~¥ 
Schneider when be is hungry and uses it to eat with. Re would not 
understand an abstract uescription of a fork as an object in and of 
itself, where one might examine its sharpness, width, and shape. 
From this study of Schneider Merleau-Ponty draws the conclusion ·· ----·----..........~ 
that concrete movement and bodily space enjoy a privileged position in 
.._ -·---~ -
humaE_ ~_yerience and, therefore, also in human knowing. Concrete 
movement and bodily space are seen as primordial and out of them grow 
--- -------· 
abstract mov_e~ent and the experience of external, objective s~a~e. To --
put it more helpfully, perhaps, for Merleau-Ponty the latter are 
grounded in the former, since they could not be without the former, 
but the reverse is not true, as the case of Schneider makes clear. 
The light is thus thrown upon the distinction between 
abstract and concrete movement: th ~_~ackground to concrete 
mov_!:!Dent_ is the world as given, whereas the background to 
abstract movement is built up ••• Concrete movement is 
th ere fore centripetal whereas abstract movement is 
centrifugal. The former occurs in the realm of being or of 
the actual, the latter on the other hand in that of the 
possible or non-existent; the first adheres to a giv:g 
background, the second throws out its own background. 
This concrete movement, then, seems to be tactile in quality and 
1.s unoerstood tacitly, whereas abstract movement is more "cognitive" 
(as this word is traditionally understood) or propositional in quality 
and is understood more explicitly. In traditional epistemology, 
concrete, tactile knowledge has been ignored because it cannot be 
articulated; it has been assumeo that knowledge requires knowing that 
one knows, i.e. explicating exhaustively the reasons why one knows. 
Thus, abstract, propositional knowing, on the other hand, has been 
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taken as the only relevant factor in epistemology. What strikes me as 
crucial in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body is that he is 
shitting the axis of epistemology from the second-order movement and ~--.--
knowledge (the abstract) to the first-order or primordial level (the 
concrete). lie is directing our attention away from the propositional 
or conceptual and towards the embodied. He claims that knowing is not 
limited to mental operations, but also includes, indeed requires as 
fundamental, bodily knowing. 
Beneath intelligence as beneath perception we discover a 
more fundamental function, a vector mobile in all directions 
like a searchlight, one through which we can direct 
ourselves towards anything, in or outside ourselves, a~~ 
display a form of behavior in relation to that object. 
This fundamental function which anchors "cognitive life, the life 
of desire or perceptual life, is an intentional arch, which brings 
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and 
· 1 · 1150 moti ity. To use, and to transform, a familiar distinction among 
contemporary epistemologists, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy calls for 
knowing that to be seen as parasitic on knowing how (propositional 
~...k.e ~ . ... ~ • ~ ·~,_...-;..,_Jo,,, -- ..... -"""" .... 
knowledge as derivative in relation to experiential knowledge). It is 
as a body in space, or as a body which inhabits space, that we intend 
and encounter the world. It is as an embodied being that ~e seek and 
find meaning. Even a newly born baby comes into the world grasping 
(greifen) and taking hold of things; it comes expecting and intending 
meaning, without first getting clear about its concepts. This 
intentional activity is not arbitrary, as can be seen from the fact 
that even a ten day old baby will imitate a smile and the act of 
sticking out its tongue. Moreover, new born infants have been shown 
to be able to distin&uisb human faces from other figures and their 
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~ mother's face from other faces. 
It is through movement in space 1 then, first greifen and then 
--~ ---· 
zeigen, that we seek and find meaning in the world. 
Already motility, in its pure state, possesses the basic 
power of giving a meaning (Sinngebung). Even if 
subsequently thought and the perception of space are freed 
from motility and spatial being 1 for us to be able to 
conceive space 1 it is in the first place necessary that we 
should have been thrust into it by our body, and that it 
should have provided us with the first model of those 
transpositions. equivalents and identifications which make 
space into an objective system and allow Qu51experience to be one of objects, opening out on 'itself.' 
I mentioned earlier that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body 
places bodily knowing at the center of all knowing 1 including 
intellectual or conceptual knowing. Let us look more closely at what 
he means by knowing with one's own body. Most of us have experienced 
the difficulty ot driving a car which has a different type of 
transmission from the one we are used to. It is so easy to forget, 
for example 1 that you are now operating a car without a clutch and to 
push down the brake pedal with your left foot. Your knowledge of bow 
to drive your own car is so much in your body that even a mental 
eftort does not always enable you to overcome it. Also 1 when a blind --
person walks down a street using her stick to guide her 1 the stick is . __ ....._ ·-
not a mere object in her hand but has become an extension of her body, 
has become a part of her body. If the blind person were to pick up a 
stick that was longer than the one she usually used, she would not 
come to know its different length by measuring it, etc., but by using 
it to poke and touch things with. She would indwell the stick by 
using it in the world, and the world through the stick. 
/ 
In the same ~ay 1 a dancer learns to dance a particular dance. be 
does not first learn a formula for tne dance, but rather be starts 
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dancing. lie begins to move his . body and slowly his body comes to know 
the dance. This same pattern holds true for those learning to play a 
musical instrument. When, for example, an experienced organist is 
about to perform on an unfamiliar instrument with only a short time in 
which to practice, 
Are we to maintain that the organist analyzes the organ, 
that he conjures up and retains a representation of the 
stops, pedals and manuals and their relation to each other 
in space? But during the short rehearsals preceding the 
concert, he does not act like a person about to draw up a 
plan. He sits on the seat, works the pedals, pulls out the 
stops, gets the measure of the instrument with his body, 
incorporates within himself the relevant directions and 
dimens!2ns, settles into the organ as one settles into a 
house. 
In the above examples of knowing one's body, the booy as 
expressive space has come to the fore. It is in and through this 
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bodily space that intentions and meanings are expressed. Therefore, ~Jf T 
bodily space, where concrete movements are performed, is not empty, 
mute, static, or natural as is objective space. Rather, it is that 
through which meaning arises. --
The boay is our general medium for having a world ••• We say 
that the body has understood and habit has been cultivated 
when it has absorbed a new meaning, and assimilated a fresh 
core of significance ••• Bodily experience forces us to 
acknowleage an imposition of meaning which is not the work 
of a universal constituting consciousness, a meaning which 
clings to certain contents. My body is that meaningful core 
which behaves like a general function, and which . 
53 nevertheless exists, and is susceptible t'o disease. 
This discussion of the motility of the body, and of its crucial role 
in our knowledge of the world, carries with it important implications 
for the subject-object dichotomy which shall be taken up in the final 
section of this paper. 
(5) The final J>Oint of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which pertains 
to our examination of its relevance for . the relation between the 
knower and the known bas to do with his concept of the synthesis of 
our own body. First of all, the spatiality of one's own body and the 
being of one's body are not two different things. They are not 
separable in experience, but are, rather, two aspects or dimensions of 
one reality. Space, for us, is rooted 1.n being, and -the body is of 
space, rather than merely in it. This difference becomes clear when 
we consider a person who, for example, regards their body or part of 
i t as an external object. Thus a person whose arm has been mutilated 
may refuse to accept it as her arm. She knows where the "thing" which 
hangs from her shoulder is, but she does not experience it as part of 
her. lier healthy parts comprise her bodily space and she experiences 
them as subject, while the malformed arm is experienced as an object 
in external space. In short, the arm in question is not part of the 
woman's bodily space and thus is not part of her b~ing. Therefore, 
one's being, one's self, and the space of one's body are 1.n synthesis 
with each other; they may perhaps be distinguished from each other in 
reflective analysis, such as in the present case, but not in normal 
experience. 
ln one's body, with respect to all aspects of it and not only its 
spatiality, there is, according to Merleau-Ponty, a unique synthesis. 
One's body is unlike a machine where different parts are simply 
co-ordinated with each other. The various bod ily parts, or better, 
dimensions, are in much greater organic unity than are the parts of a 
machine. The different dimensions of a human body and their function 
are, as it were, "superimposed" upon each other, they interpenetrate 
each other. 
l'he connecting link between the parts of our body and that 
between our visual and tactile experience are not forged 
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gradually and cumulatively. I do not translate the 'data of 
touch' into the 'language of seeing' or vice versa - I do 
not bring together one by one the parts of my body; this 
transaction and this unification are per§grmed once and for 
all within me: they are my body itself. 
The unity and synthesis of the different dimensions in a work of 
art provides an excellent model for understanding that of a living 
human body. As Bannan states: 
In an attempt to characterize the body more globally 
Merleau-Ponty seeks an expression that will signify it in 
its synthesis with consciousness. The unity of this 
synthesis is much too variable, subtle and flexible to be 
conveyed by any classic or otherwise established 
formulation. Merleau-Ponty proposes an analogy with another 
reality whose unity is highly mys;~rious but nonetheless 
unquestionable: the work of ar t. 
That which unites the various particular s comprising a painting, for 
instance, is not itself an identifiable or objectifiable entity which 
gets its reality and meaning exclusively from the parts. They, 
rather, get their significance from it, and are synthesized by means 
of it. So, too, and even more so, do the dimensions comprising the 
embodied existence of human beings obtain their reality and meaning by 
means of the synthesis which is the living, moving body. The meaning - . 
of a painting is in tne painting, and although it cannot be talked 
about or experienced apart from the particulars which make it up, this 
meaning cannot be reduced to an analytic summary of those particulars. 
As -Merleau-Ponty said: "The work ot art begins to transmit an 
uninterrupted message. But the meaning of the work for the artist or 
for the public cannot be stated except by the work itself: neither 
the thought which created it nor the thought which receives it is 
56 completely its own master. 11 
Questions like: 11Where is the meaning in the painting?," "Have 
you put the meaning into the painting yet?," and "Can you paint the 
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painting without the meaning? are, needless to say, bizarre. The 
meaning of a painting, like its harmony, vigor, sadness, and tension, 
is embodied in the work and is experienced i,!! and through its 
particulars without being reducible to them. The particular shapes, 
colors, lines, etc. are so synthesized in the painting that they 
mediate its meaning to us. As Cezanne put it: "If I paint all the 
little blues and all the little maroons, I capture and convey his 
glance. 1157 In like manner, Cezanne sought to paint a scene described 
by Balzac as a "tablecloth white as a layer of newly fallen snow, upon 
which the place-settings arise symmetrically, crowned with bread 
rolls." Cezanne, however, was not confident that he would be able to 
paint "crowned" and expressed his doubt in this fashion: "Now I know 
that one must will only to paint the place-settings rising 
symmetrically and the bread rolls. If I paint 'crowned' I've had it, 
58 you understand?" Cezanne understood that the meaning, the 
expression of a painting cannot be detached from the particulars which 
embody it. One cannot have the parts of this individual painting 
apart trom the painting itself; they become parts of this painting by 
participating in it. 1his is the sort of synthesis that ~erleau-Ponty 
discerns amidst the various parts and functions ot the human body. It 
constitutes their unity. lie puts it this ~ay: 
A novel, poem, picture, or musical work are inaividuals, 
that is, beings in whic h the expression is indistinguishable 
from the thing expre s se d, their meaning, accessible only 
through direct contact, being mediated with no change of 
their temporal and spatial situation. It is in this sense 
our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a nexus of 
living meanings, not the 5§unction of a certain number of mutually variable terms. · 
Now, let me summarize the foregoing points presented above in 
order to show how they bea r on the problem of the knower and the 
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known. Let us take the five points as outlined and see how they might 
contribute to overcoming the epistemic gap between the subject and the 
object. 
We do not experience our own body as an object among other 
objects in the world, unless a part of it is rejected for one reason 
or another. In a normal situation we do ~ot, in fact we cannot, 
experience our own body as an object partes extra partes. In other 
words, a mechanistic understanding of our own body is neither helpful 
nor possible, given the realities of our bodily existence, except in 
such specialized contexts as medical diagnosis, etc. We experience 
our own bodies quite differently from the way we experience other 
bodies. We experience them as both subject and object, 
simultaneously, and the fact that, when we feel pain in our foot, the 
pa in-giver and that which is in pain are one and the same, 
\ 
demonstrates that we know our own body because we~ our body. 
~ubsequently, in talking or and understanding our body as both 
subject~ object we see that the traditional epistemological 
aistinction between the knowing subject and the known object does not 
apply. My body is an object in the world in some sense, but not as 
partes extra partes, and my body is a subject also, but not a 
disembodied one. The body, then, and our understanding of it, 
provides a point of departure for a fresh approach to the relationship 
between the knower and the known. 
The spatiality of one's own body, too, is qui t e different from 
that of other things. The parts of my body are incorporated into my 
bodily space, which is not abstract, mute, or neutral, but which makes 
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up my very way of being in the world and my body image. Space, in 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, has lost its "objecti ve" 
character and has become relational instead. For example, this cup on 
the table is not a neutral object in abstract space, but it is a cup 
of mine in front of me in our camper and from which earlier I drank my 
coffee. The basic relationality of bodily space leaves no room for 
epistemic distance between the subject and the object, for it 
constitutes the two in relation to each other. 
Motility in our bodies also expresses our relationality with 
ourselves and with the world. Concrete bodily movement is our 
foothold from which all our efforts at meaning and knowledge 
achievement make their initial departure. It is for this reason that 
Merleau-Ponty prefers the phrase, 'I can,' to Descartes' 111 think, 
therefore 1 am.1160 
It is as moving bodies of space that we move in space; t is as 
embodied and moving that we accomplish knowledge. The relationship of 
our body parts and tunctions to each other is crucial to the 
possibility of overcoming the subject-object dichotomy if the 
knowledge of ourselves as embodied beings is to serve as the paradigm 
for all knowing. The parts and functions of our body must be 
understood as inherently and integrally one in order for the epistemic 
gap to be eliminated. 
The maJor point here 18 that the human body, in not being made up 
of parts which are related to each other objectively or externally, 
does not exist in abstract space, but l.S in inextricable relation to 
and with itself in its own space, and with its surr oundin gs s well 
as by virtue of its motility. Furthermore, other bodies and persons 
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ao not exist "out there" as objects in abstract space, on the far side 
of the epistemig gap, but they exist 10 relation to me and each other 
as I and they interact with one another in common, relational space. 
~e gain our individuality from each other reciprocally. This 
reciprocity might be more clearly understood if one thinks of subjects 
and objects again as two poles in a common electromagnetic field. The 
positive and negative poles get their reality and identity from each 
other; when one ceases to exist, so also does the other. They can be 
talked about separately, but they can neither exist nor be experienced 
apart from each other. In the same way, it seems to me that Merleau-
Ponty is saying that it is best to think about the relationship 
between the knower and the known as symbiotic in character. The 
knower lS a knower only in relation to that which is lmollln; and the 
known is the known only in relati on to a knower. Both get their 
significance from the other. 
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3. A Philosophy of Language 
In the previous section we have seen how bodily activity 
expresses our intentions and meanings. One form of bodily activity 
is, of course, linguistic behavior. Language as a bodily activity 
can, according to Merleau-Ponty, be viewed as a connecting link 
between the knowing subject and the known object, as a way of 
overcoming the traditional yet problematic dichotomy that is the focus 
of this present thesis. It is essential to have a handle on Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy of language in order to understand this connecting 
link. For the purposes of this present stuay it may prove helpful to 
think of language in relation to the following three dimensions of 
experience: thought, the world, and the body. Let us now see if and 
how Merleau-Ponty ' s philosophy of l anguage will contribute to the 
resolutio n of the problem of the epistemic gap. Merlea u-Po nt y himself 
is quite direct about it. He says: "In trying to describe the 
phenomenon of speech and the specific act of meaning, we shall have 
th e opportunity to leave behind us, once and for all, the traditional 
b . b ' d ' h 
61 su Ject-o Ject 1c otomy. 
Row are language and thought related to each other? Very 
intimately, according to Merleau-Ponty; there is no thought apart 
from language. Language is the incarnation of thought and ne~ther has 
significance apart from the other. In some theories of language, 
thought is said to exist before, and thus independently of, speech. 
In such views one can have thoughts without words as well as thoughts 
with words. Merleau-Ponty disagrees and says: "A thought limited to 
existing for itself, independently of the constraints of speech and 
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communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink into the 
unconscious, which means that it would not exist, even for itself. 1162 
We do not first have a · concept in our mind and then put it into words. 
When i fix my eyes on an object in the half-light, and say: 
'It is a brush,' there is not in my mind the concept of a 
brush, under which i subsume the object and which moreover 
is linked by frequent association with the word 'brush,' but 
the word bears the meaning, and by imposing it g~ the 
object, i am conscious of reaching that object. 
l'hus Merleau-Ponty says that "speech ••• does not translate ready-
made thought, but accomplishes it. 1164 The meaning of a sentence, 
then, is not distinct from the words, for the words embody the 
meaning. In the same way as one does not have pre-existing thoughts 
prior to language, one does not have meaning prior to language. 
Thought and meaning are embodied, incarnated in language in a way 
similar to the way a glance was said by Cezanne to be embodied in the 
colors of a portrait painting. Rere is what Sallis says about 
Merleau-Ponty's view of the relationship between thought and speech: 
An idea ••• comes into my possession only by means of an act 
of expression in which I make it dwell in my language: 'I 
say that a signification is acquired and henceforth 
available when I have succeeded in making it dwell in a 
speech apparatus.' (Signs, 91). Thought terminates in 
speech; 'one g3es not know what one says, one knows after 
having said. ' 
Interestingly enough, the passage that Sallis quotes in the above 
quotation shows that Merleau-Pooty agreed with this point as late as 
1960, when he wrote Signs. 
If one only knows ~hat one says after saying it, it makes no 
sense to speak as if the meaning of an utterance could be known apart 
from the utterance. Merleau-Ponty remarks: "The orator doe s not 
think before speaking, nor even while speaking; his speech is his 
6ti thought." Even now as I am writing these sentences, I do not have 
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wordless thoughts about and prior to what I am writing. My 
thoughts are opening up onto the paper.!!_ I write. It is the same 
way with speech; it is possible to begin a sent .ence without any idea 
of what the last word of the sentence will be. Under normal 
circumstances we work our thoughts out as we go • 
••• speech is not the 'sign' of thought, if by this we 
understand a phenomenon which heralds another as smoke 
betrays fire. Speech and thought would admit of this . 
external relation only if they were both thematically given, 
whereas in fact they are intervolved, the sense being held 
within the wo61, and the word being the external existence of the sense. 
This integral relationship between language and thought, or 
meaning, is similar to that between melody and notes in a musical 
piece. without the notes there would be no music. It is impossible 
even to hum a melody silently without embodying the hum in notes; 
not, of course, in written symbols, but in the actual musical notes 
themselves. In other words, a song can only exist 1n one's mind as a 
musical piece; if it is not embodied in notes and melody then it 
simply does not exist. Similarly with language and thought, the 
latter is in reality a silent form of the former. As *erleau-Ponty 
says: 11lhis ••• silence is alive with words, this inner life · is an 
68 inner language." 
Now that we have some iaea of how Merleau-Ponty understands the 
relationship between language and thought, let us see how he treats 
that between language and the world. First ot all, he rejects the 
so-called "picture theory" of lan&uage in which words are regarded as 
univocal signs or labels for states of affairs. lie says: "what the 
normal person possesses 1s not a stock of words, but a certain way of 
- 69 using them." Further on he continues: "And as, in a foreign 
' 
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country, I begin to understand the meaning of words through their 
place in a context of action, and by taking part in a communal 
l . f .. 70 Th 1 e... e use of words, then, is the key notion here. 
Merleau-Ponty would agree with ordinary language philosophers when 
they maintain that meaning is a function of use in context. Through 
regul ar usage in cont i nuously overlapping contexts utterances acquire 
a meaning, a "sedimentation," which though relatively stable continues 
to shift as the purposes and consequences of their use evolve. 71 As 
Mallin puts it: 11Merleau-Ponty agrees with or d inary language 
philosophy that linguistic meaning 1s not self-subsistent, and t hat i f 
it can be found anywhere it is to be found in language's use. 1172 
So one does not, according to Merleau-Ponty, have a storage-bag 
full of words that exist independently of the objects which they name, 
pulling out the appropriate word-tags whenever need be. On the 
contrary, there 1s an integral and inextricable organic relationship 
between words and the world. Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to claim 
that language pa rt icipates in and helps to constitute the world. He 
expresses this aync1mic constituti ve in th.e following manner: "£'or 
pr e-scientific thinking, naming an object is causi ng it to exist or 
changing it: God creates beings by naming them and magic operates 
73 upon the m by speaking of them." 
~a t ur ~lly, we ao not create things 1n the world ex nihilo by 
means of speech. Yet there seems to be some sense in which it 1s 
proper to say that our reality 1s linguistically constituted. It is 
common knowleage, for example, that if a child is called a "slow 
learner" from a very young age on, she may well in fact become a slow 
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learner, even though she possesses an average ability. Again, if a 
,· 
grown up woman or man is continually referred to as a "girl" or "boy" 
respectively, they may actually behave in ways appropriate to such 
designations. Remy Kwant makes Merleau-Ponty's point quite clear: 
"The 'word' does not pqint to a reality already existing for us before 
it was named, but on the contrary it makes this reality exist for 
us. 1174 l 'herefore, in l'lerleau-Ponty' s view, the use of language to a 
large de~ree creates and alters our lived reality. 
It also seems to be the case that a particular aspect of reality 
calls for certain linguistic usage. For example, Eskimoes have over 
thirty different terms for designating different kinds of snow and no 
word for snow in general. we only have a few words for distinguishing 
different kinds of snow conditions. The Eskimoes' environment and 
life style call for more names for snow and therefore there are more 
kinds of snow for them. Thus there is a symbiotic relationship 
between reality and language, they affect each other. Language 
aevelops through use in relation to particular aspects of the world, 
' 
lolhile the world is "seen as" or experiencea as different as a r esult 
of lan~uage. lt is time to turn our attention to the relationship 
between language and the body in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. 
The relationship between language and the body in Merleau-Ponty's 
thought is as important as it is intimate. In fact, for the purposes 
of the present study _this relationship is clearly the most important 
of all. It is this relationship which gives clues as to the 
acquisition and thus the origin of speech. For Merleau-Ponty, 
language grows out of our bodily existence. For clarity's sake it is 
helpful at this stage of our discussion to introduce a distinction 
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which Merleau-Ponty makes in the Phenomenology.£!_ Perception 75 between 
two types of language . One he calls "speech" (la parole), and the 
other "language" (la langue). The former is the expression of the 
child who names an object for the first time, or of the artist who 
gives expression to an ,original meaning. Both create through speech. 
Speech, then, is the authentic or primordial form of expression; it 
is the "word in the speaking" where meaning l8 formulated for the 
first time. Language, on the other hand, is established or instituted 
speech, it is the "spoken word." Language names objects according to 
their sedimented meanings. It is the empirical form of expression · 
because "its words and expressions have become stereotyped by 
76 usage," to use Barral's phrase. 
77 Furthermore, language grows out of speech. An artist, child, 
philosopher, or scientist names an aspect of reality for the first 
time, perhaps by means of a metaphor, such as referring to the base of 
a mountain as its "foot." Through continued use the words of 
authentic speech become part of everyday, empirical language. The 
original insight has become a sedimented expression in common usage. 
Rere is how Merleau-Ponty explains the relationship between speech and 
language: 
Languages or constituted systems of vocabulary and syntax, 
empirically existing 'means of expression' are both 
repository and residue of acts of speech, in which 
unformulated significance not only finds the means of being 
conveyed outwardly, but moreover acquires existen5§ for 
itself, and is genuinely created as significance. 
Therefore, the spoken ~ord owes its existence, not to any external, 
ready-made definition or meaning, but to the word in speaking, to the 
act of speech itself. 
A question arises, however: 11liow does speech as a mode of 
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expression come to exist?" At this juncture it is helpful to 
introduce Merleau-Ponty's notion of speech as gesture. Speech, in one 
sense, grows out of silence, but not from an unexpressive and mute 
silence. Rather, it springs from the silence of gestural expression. 
In other words, before the child names an object for the first time, 
or the poet expresses what G. !1. Hopkins termed an original "inscape, 11 
each in authentic speech, the body has already communicated without 
words. we often speak today of "body language," meaning that a 
person's posture and movements transmit a great deal of nonverbal 
meaning. Sometimes, in fact, a person's body language communicates 
more, and more deeply or truely, than do the spoken words. 
There is, then, meaning in our gestures. How is this meaning in 
our gestures and how is it discerned? According to Merleau-Ponty, the 
gestures and postures embody their meaning. Anger, for instance, is 
actually i!!_ the clenched fist. we do not inter that a person is angry 
because we remember that we, too, clenched our fists when we were 
angry. No, for Merleau-Ponty, the clenched fist both is and 
communic a tes anger. 111 <10 not see anger or a threatening attitude as 
a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in it. lhe 
. f . . lf 1179 ges t ure~ .!!2!_ make~ think o anger, it is anger 1tse • 
The meaning of the gesture is in the gesture, embodied in it in 
the way "crowned" was embodied in the table setting which Ceza nne 
hoped to paint, as we saw in a previous section. In other words , t he 
meaning in a bodily gesture is not a separate, external and 
independent concept, but resides in and is mediated by the gesture 
itself. We understand other people's gestures, not by means of an 
inferential process, but because we are all embodied beings. We 
45 
humans are qualitatively alike. Because of our common embodied 
existence we stand in a unique relationship to each other. Here is 
Merleau-Ponty's explanation of our ability to understand each other's 
gestures: 
The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about 
through .the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures 
of others, of my gestures and intentions discernable in the 
conduct of others. It is as ifbbhe other person's intention 
inhabited my body and mine his. 
Furthermore, language, which grows out of speech, which in turn 
grows out of bodily gestures, remains gestural. It does so because it 
grows out of and remains grounded in bodily expression. Therefore, 
the meaning is in language in the same way as meaning is in the 
gesture, namely as embodied. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: 11'.Che spoken 
word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way 
h . . t 1181 as t e gesture contains i • Thus the meaning of a lw'ord or gesture 
cannot be reduced to an account of the particulars comprising it, 
whether they be specific phonemes and grammatical patterns or 
positions and movements of limbs, etc. Even the actual physiological 
factors by means of which we produce the sounds comprising spoken 
language participate in and mediate the meaning which they serve to 
convey. They, too, function as bodily gestures which anchor 
linguistic meaning in the commonality of our shared physical and 
social existence. Merleau-Ponty describes the interconnections 
between such seemingly insignificant physical factors and linguistic 
meaning in the following fashion: 
Language, in its turn, presents no different a problem: a 
contraction of the throat, a sibilant emission of air 
between the tongue and the teeth, a certain way of bringing 
the body into play suddenly allows itself to be invested 
with a figurative significance which is conveyed outside us. 
This is neither more nor less miraculous than the emergence 
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of love from desire, or that of gestg 2e from the unco-ordinated movements of infancy. 
Let us now see how this view of language as an integral dimension 
of thought, world, and body can be of help in the task of overcoming 
the dichotomy between the knowing subject and the known object. We 
noted earlier in this section that thought and language can, in 
Merleau-Fonty's view, cannot exist separately, each receiving its 
significance in and through the other. We also saw that for Merleau-
Ponty the world and language exist in a similar symbiotic relationship 
to each other. Moreover, we have come to see that language itself is 
part and parcel of embodied existence as mediated through 
gesture. Understanding language as gestural from start to finish, and 
as integrally connected with both thought and the world, provides a 
helpful axis around which to integrate the knower and the known, 
namely the body itself. 
In traditional epistemologies, the knowing subject has generally 
been regarded as the mind alone, while the objects to be known have 
been separated from the knowing mind by the body, · specifically the 
senses. ln ~erleau-Ponty's philosophy, however, thought is always 1n 
language, language is at least originally gestural and thus embodied, 
and therefore disembodied thought in the knower's mind is out of the 
question. Language, being inherently gestural, mediates our embodied 
existence. Thought, in Merleau-Ponty's epistemology, cannot be 
separated from the objects of knowledge because it is "grounded" 1n 
the body, which in turn is grounded in the world. Thought is 
"grounded" in the body in the following way. Thought is always 
embodied in language and language grows out of speech, which in turn 
grows out of bodily gestures, both kinaesthetic and tonal. Therefore, 
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thought is grounded in the body. Body, for its part, is grounded in 
the world, because it is of the world. Merleau-Ponty says that our 
bodies inhabit the world, and thus they belong to the world. 
Although thought, language, the body, and the world are in some 
sense hierarchically related to each other, none is the cause of the 
others. They are, rather, dimensions of each ot her. Therefore, no 
gap between the knower and the known need or can arise in 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. It is this symbiotic relationship between 
thought, language, the body, and the world that Merleau-Ponty had in 
mind when he promised that "we shall have the opportunity to leave 
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Chapter Two 
Merleau-Ponty's Relational Epistemology 
ln Chapter One of the present study the focus was on 
Merleau-Ponty'• philosophy of embodiment. First his critique of 
empiricism, intellectuali••• and Kant's epistemology waa examined. 
Then his philosophy of the body, including hia philosophy of language 
as gesture, was explicated. Now it is tiae to see how 
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the roles of the body and langua e 
relate to three aain epiateaological categories: our knowledge of 
the world, other persons. and the self. It.· ,should be noted at this 
point that the order in which Merleau-Ponty deals with these 
categories is not the one traditionally used in modern philosop hy, 
where one starts ·wit ·h the knowledge of the self• mov s on to the 
knowledge of others, and finally arrives at the knowledge of the 
external world. Given that all three of these dimensions of 
knowledge and experience are for Merleau-Ponty, in a symbiotic 
relationship, each iettin~ its significance from the others, the 
order of investigation does not seem to be of great importance. 
Rowever, I shall follow Merleau-Ponty's order . ~ather than the 
.·, .t 
tradi.tional one to avoiu assumptions which might be implied by the 
latter order, namely that ·''the knowledge of t_he self is primordial and 
the basis for the other kinds of knowledge. For Merleau-Ponty none 
of these three kin4• of knowledge is primary ~or prior to any other. 
One learns to know oneself i~ Jelation to the . world and to other 
people, just as oth~rs and the world as well are known in relation to 
the self and each other. Therefore, no hierarchical order ia iaplied 
by the sequence of ~he followi?g discussion. 
53 
i 
l. Our ~nowledge of the World 
In Merleau-Ponty's phi l osophy, what is often referred to by the 
misl ead in g term of "ext er nal world" is known in relation to the 
embodied self and other embodied persons. Things do not exist 
independently in abs t ract space, as is the case in many other more 
traditional philosophies. Aa we noted i n the second part of the 
first chapter, apace ia not an abstract reality for Merleau-Ponty. 
On the contrary, space becomes apace as we interact and move within 
it. More pointedly, we know where our body ia and in what position 
our limbs are without havin& to look around us. Aa Merleau-Ponty 
says, our arma cannot be said to be resting on the table next to 
other objects in the way that the candle can be aaid to be next to 
the flower vase. In other words, our body ia not a neutral object in 
abstract apace, it is our way of being-in-the-world. Moreover, 
neither can it be said of othe~ objects in the world that they exist 
as eternal and inert ent i ties in abatract apace. Because we inhabit 
apace in and through our bodies, the thin&• which are in space with 
us are inhabited by us as well. Therefore, we are in an intimate 
relationship with objects because we share apace with them~ We know 
the world bec,uae we belong to it and are of it, because we are 
incarnated in it. Merleau-Ponty eaploya the metaphor of intercourse, 
linguistic, so c i al, and sexual, aa a way of atTeaaing the deep 
relational quality of our knowledge of the -world of thin&•• 
To this extent, every perception ia a c0111111unication or a 
c01&111.union, the taking up or completion by ua of some 
extraneous intention or, on the other hand, the complete 
expression outside ourselves of our perceptual 1powera and coition, so to speak, of our body with things. 
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In traditional epiateaologiea the aepai-ation of the knower from 
the known ia, I think, partly a reault of the dallinance of vision aa 
a model for knowing. Beginniq with Plato seeing baa been the 
paradigm of both error and truth: error, because the body is said to 
distort reality, truth, because the body can be transcended through 
the "eye of the soul. 11 Traditionally, seeing has always implied a 
distance or epistemic gap between the viewer and the viewed, thus 
giving rise to the subject-object dichotomy in epistemology. 
liowever, even this model is used by kerleau-Ponty in such a way aa to 
counteract thi• se paration between the subject and the object. 
Vision in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is understood as a form of 
"touch at a distance," and thus even with respect to seeing no gap 
can ar ise between the "gazer" and that which is "gazed at." As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it in his last work, "the look ••• envelopea, 
palpates, espouses the visible thinga. 112 It ia, therefore, also 
through vision that we are in t .oucb with the so-called "external 
world," since we are a lways linked up with phenomena in an integral, 
inextricable fashion. 
In the Visibl e and th e I nvisible Merleau-Ponty speaks of the - --
relatio n between our 1elvea and th e worl d more specifically. We are 
linked up with physical phenomena because we are like the, because we 
are made of the 1ame material, namely flesh. Merleau-Ponty use• this 
term "flesh" in a rather technical way, and does not see■ to limit it 
to matter in the tradit ,ional sense. liowever, the aetaphor of flesh 
signifiea the qualitative similarity between our bodies, which we 
.!!:!,., and the objects in the world. lie speaks of this "invisible 
thickness" between the seer and the seen in the followiog way: 
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·· 'Between the alleged colors and viaiblea, we would find 
anew the tiaaue that linea thea, auataina thea, nouriahea 
· tbea, and which for it a part ia not a thin&, b~t a 
poaaibility, a latency, and a flesh of tbi11&•• 
It is that the thickness of fleah between the aeer and the 
thin& ia constitutive for the thing of ita visibility aa 
for the aeer of bia corporaity; it ia not an obatacle 
between them, it is their meana of cOURunication ••• The 
thickneaa of the body • •• ia ••• the sole mean~ I have to ao 
into the heart of thi11&•, but aak~ .lli ay1elt a world and by 
making them fleah. 
According to the above quotations, there ia a "fleah of thin&•" 
and a flesh of ouraelvea, "the thicknesa of the body" which can make 
ayaelf a worid and the world a fleah. This c0111111on fleab is a reault 
of our mutual interdependence and reciprocity, "a coilin& over of the 
visible upon the viaible. 115 Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty aaya that 
flesh ia not matter, but it ia not ideational either. lie calla it "a 
sort of incarnate principle.u 6 We are flesh, but things in the world 
are flesh, too. As I underatand it, things are aaid to be flesh 
because t hey are in communication with ua and inhabit the aaae 
relational space aa we do. The qualitative similarity between the 
knower and the ~nown, the perceiver and the perceived, ia expreaaed 
by Merleau-Ponty in the following way: "It , auftice• for us for the 
moment to note that he who seea cannot posaess the visible . unless be 
i• poaaesaed by it, unleaa he is of it. 117 ---
Merleau-Ponty's notion of "fleah" ia especially difficult to 
interpret. 8 It aerves, I think, aa a pivotal metaphor, auggestin& a 
kind of living aonisa aa an alternative to traditional dualisma. 
Thia moniam is, however, bipolar at the outaet. It is neither 
inanimate matter, on ~he one band, nor disembodied mind, on the 
other. Fleah ia, rather, a unique phenomenon, "an incarnate 
principle" incorporatiq both pbyaical reality and more, 
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simultan~oualy •nd inai•tin&uishably. 
John Sallis calls the relationship between the seer and the 
seen, between the body and the world, "incor~oration." He puts it 
this way: 
In vision the thing seen is incorporated, the body draws 
the t~saue of the thin& to itself in such a way that the 
thing is made to function as an extension of •y•elf as 
visible ••• the thing seen serves as the mediation by which I 
would be completely present to myself, by which the bodily 
reflection, th§ seeiq of myself aeeiq 1 would be brouaht 
to completion. 
As Sallis unders.tanda Merleau-Ponty's thouaht with respect to our 
knowledae of the world, the knower ia only coaplete when in relation 
to the known. Therefore, it is no longer appropriate to talk of 
subjects and objects of knowledge as independent entities apart from 
each other, because it has become clear that a perceiver needs the 
perceived to be complete. The perceived object ia regarded as an 
extension of the body by Merleau-Ponty. 
In order better to understand the intimate relationship between 
the body and thing• in the world, it might be helpful to explain how 
Merleau-Ponty views tbe role of perceived objects. In his view, the 
perceived things also "perceive" the human body. Let me try to 
explain. Since we are embodied beinas, we can only experience an 
from one kinaesthetic perspective at a time. As we look at an 
object, a cup for instance, frca any one perspective we see only one 
side of it. By aeeing that one side we are, in a sense, told by the 
object where.!!. are. Sallis explains this . odd sounding phenomenon in 
this way: 
The thing, in its very way of presenting itself to ay 
seeing, points to that place from which it ia seen, points 
to the seer's position in the midst of the visible, thereby 
reflecting back to the seer an image of himself aa ao 
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.. po•itioned. Hence, in 1eein& thing1 I see ayaelf seeing. lO 
We have all probably experienced 1omethin& of tbi1 phenomenon at a 
carvival, when we have been turned up1ide down while riding in a 
loop-o-plane. Sometime, the only way we can tell that~ are upside 
down i1 from the fact that the world .out1ide of the plane appear• to 
be upaide down. Renee, we are told by our envirooment how we are 
placed in it. 
The thinas in the world and our bodiea, then, are in an organic 
and ayabiotic relationship to each other. The tbin&1 aet their 
identity and 1ianificance in relation to the body and the body aet1 
iu identity and significance in relation to the tbinga. In "Eye and 
Mind" Merleau-Ponty make1 the followina remark about the intearal 
relationabip between the sensible and the aenaed: "Quality, light, 
color , depth, whic h are there before us, are there only becau1e they 
awaken an echo in our body and because the body welcomes ' tbem. 1111 
Consider 1ome concrete ~aaplea. Soae aculptors, for inatance, 
feel that they need to apend ti■e with the atone which they are 
planning to work with in order to find out what the stone "wants to 
be." Eskimo artists have been reported aa 1aying that they are 
merely releasing the figure fr011 within the atone. 
In Eakimo art an artiat'• carvings are responses to the 
material which he works. In the sananguaq-art context bis 
responses are physical, aenauous, tactile and intuitive. 
The material suggests the subject matter which in turn 
suggests fora. Tiktak bas said: 'I do not think out what 
I will do. My tbougbi 2coaes out while I work. My work expresses my thought. . . . 
Usina Sallis• terainolo&y, the object 1n quest ion 1eema to "solicit" 
a re1pon1e frca the aubject. Already in Pbenomenolo&Y 2!. Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty spoke of thia intercoaaunication behleen the body and 
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the objec ,ta . ~o the world in the followin& way: 
It ia my gaze which aubteoda the color and the aovemeot of 
ay hand which aubtenda the objects form, or rather ay &a&e 
pair• off with color, and my hand with hardnesa and 
aoftness, and in thia tranaactioo between the aubject of 
aenaation and the aenaible it cannot be held that one acta 
while the other suffers thy 3action, or that one confers aignificance on the other. 
Up to this point we have talked about the body'• relationship to 
the known object aa symbiotic in a atrictly positive manner. In 
other words, the two have been aaid to exist io a constructive 
relationship to each other . Bannan sakes a point, however, which 
sheds li&ht oo an additional aspect of this relationship. He seeks 
to focua the tension which necesaarily auat exist between the subject 
and the object of knowledge. Although they are in a symbiotic, 
interdependent relationship, they mut not be thought of as in 
absolute harmony. ~egardless of the fact that the body ia a 
condition for there beina any known objects, aa such, these objects 
and body-subject are in a dialectical relationship to each other. 
Bannan aays t hat "the terms are bound toaether because of their 
differences ••• They are joined in their opposition, opposed in their 
21 mutual dependence. 11 In a aenae, then, the difference between the 
subject and the object keepa them apart aa much as their commonality 
keeps them together. Again, the analogy of a magnetic force-field 
aeema to apply. The poaitive and negative poles each receive their 
reality, as well aa their significance, fr0111 the opposing other. The 
tension between the interdependent poles i~ both a function of and 
the condition for their respective r.ealities. So, too, with the 
knower and the known. 
Language alao plays a crucial role in our coaing to know the 
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world, acco ·rding to Merleau-Ponty. However, a• we aoted earlier, we 
do not first have language aDd then naae object• with it. Rather, 
the world and laquage, aa symbiotic dimenaiona of our embodied 
existence, ahape each other. Therefore, we coae to know the world a• 
liD&uiatic as well as eabodied beiqa. Our language both effect• and 
affects our reality, but it ia also effected and affected by the 
world in which we live. Aa was aentioned in the first chapter, 
Eskimo• have over thirty word• for different kinda of snow because 
their world is aade up almost entirely of snow. At the aaae time, it 
can be ar &ued that there is a sense in which they have thirty kinda 
of snow because they have so aany words for it. That ia to say, as 
youq Eskimo children are inculturated into their world through 
language, they COllle to.!!! these aany different kinda of snow. The 
language we uae in f l uences bow we experience our world and thus how 
we know our world. 
To turn the matter around ., people who do not have words for 
certain realities do not, in many cases, experience those realities. 
here one is reminded of Charles Darwin's account of how the natives 
of Tierra del Fuego made absolutely no acknoweldgement of the huge 
ship which lay at anchor off their shore, presumably becauae it was 
simply too far beyond their nautical experience and vocabulary, even 
though they paid a great deal of attention to the rowboat• in which 
' 14 Darwin and the crew bad come ashore. Laoauage, for Merleau-Ponty, 
grows out of our interaction with the world, and thus we cannot speak 
of the effects of language on the world in a vacuum. However, it can 
be said that at least in soae instances one'• language can create, 
change and reflect one's reality. Merleau-Ponty coapares the 
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relationahip · between one'• body and the world to that between a heart 
d b . . h. h . 
0 d lS an t e oraan1aa 10 w 1c it rea1 ea. The body ia thua understood 
a• beina in a livin& relationship with the world; it ia both & the 
-., 
world and givea life ~ the world, and yet it ca~not °live wit hout the 
world. Aa a concrete example of this oraanic relationship, Merleau-
Ponty offer, an analysia of our encounter with a cube. 16 He aaya 
that although we can only see the cube froa one an&le at a time, and 
thu• never perceive the whole cube, we nevertheleaa know that it ia a 
cube. Furthermore, he ara uea t hat we do not add up all the 
aenaationa we receive frOll various perspective• and conclude that we 
are experiencing a cube. On the contrary, the cube is experience d by 
ua as a cube in the aaae way that a part of our own body is 
experienced aa a coaplete part, say a foot, even though we do not at 
any time perceive it in ita entirety. • Ky body ia "already there" for 
me, it is a given, not a concluaion. Similarly. the world, the cube, 
is already there for ua; its reality and wholeness ia , in a sense, 
self-evident. The world is in some sense part of me, it is an 
extenaion of my body , and therefore it is not necessary to engage 1n 
an inierential process in order to be assured of its existence. 
Merleau-Ponty expresaea thia relationship between the body and the 
world quite pointedly when he says: 
The thing, the world, are given to me along with the parts 
of my body, not by any 'natural geometry,' but in a living 
connection comparable, or rather identical, wf~b that 
existin& between the parts of my body itself. 
External objecta, therefore, for Kerleau-Ponty are not mere 
natural objecta in abstract apace, but they are endowed with their 
identity and aianificance in relation to the _knowiq body. It ia aa 
if the world and our bodies are woven together by mean• of their 
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■utual interaction into a seaalesa fabric whose pattern is traced and 
reflected by ·our . ia~guage. Merleau-Ponty p~ppoints this interaction 
very effecti¥ely when be says that there is 
a relationship of active transcendence between the subje~t 
and the world. l 'be world is inseparable from the subject, 
but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the 
world, and the subject is inseparab}§ from the world, but 
from a world which projects itself. 
A bit later on we shall see how the aelf 1a a project of the world . 
For now it ia sufficient to focua on bow the world is a project of 
the knowing body-aubject. 
Kallin coaea to this discussion from an intereating angle. He 
notes t he fact that we know there is a six-sided object in front of 
u1 even though we can at most only see three .sides at any given tiae. 
He is concerne d about the question of how it is that inc0111plete 
per spetival vi ewa of an object nevertheless make it very clear to ua 
that these vi ews theaaelvea are incc:aplete, and thus suggest to ua 
the re a lity of a complete obje~t. Mallin says that the various 
perspectives we have of an object are almost "mystically" connected 
to each other. There is mystery in their connection because if one 
were to take photogr _apha of all tbe anales that a person uaually haa 
of a cube, for example, seldom if ever would one be able to arrange 
the photos 10 a sequence in such a way that the result would in fact 
be a six-sided, ayanetrical cube. Therefore, Kallin thinks, we do 
not mathematically add our perceptual senaationa together and come up 
with the conclusion that there ia a six-sided object here before us. 
&ather, the object in question ia auggeated or mediated to us by the 
incomplete views we have of it. Thia is bow Kallin states the point: 
Yet we have seen that the thing "emanates" troa within i t s 
appearancea. Thia follows because if the appearances are 
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su~ficiently fulfilled or "fixed" they refer ua to a 
conatant property which carried the accent of the thing 
ita e lf. iven when these appearances are too vague to give 
ua a particular thing, they still refer us generally 
1
§o 
that ~hicb bas triggered their confused preaentation. 
Mallin'• remarks remind me of the way metaphors and indirect 
language are often said to funct i on. As indirect fonia of speech do 
not tell ill t he trut h in any given ut teranc;:e, but tell it "slant, 1120 
au&gesting the whole truth, 10 too a limited perapectival view of a 
given obj ect auuests and mediates the whole object. The fullness of 
a s i x-aided cube is experienced in and through the particular yet · 
incomplete perspectives available to us at any one time. And yet, 
the cube cannot be reduced to a mere collection of such perspectives, 
but r emaina a mystery which is evoked by thea. Moreover, without 
these perspectival particulara we would not experience the cube at 
all. Thus the complete viewa are both necessary and, in a sense, 
suffici ent for us to know the cube, while the latter is not simply 
the sum total of the visual part icula _rs from which it emanates or 
through which it is mediated. 
The knowing subject and the known object are, then, fo r Merleau-
Ponty, never thought of as separate entities but are aspects of a 
single relational phenomenon. They together make up the rea li ty 
which is knowing, and hence they can be said to constitute each 
other. A knower becomes a knower in relation to the known, and a 
known object gets its significance and identity in relation to a 
knowing subject. With thi s understanding _in mind, let us now aove on 
to a consideration of the second epistemological category aeotioned 
at the outset of this chapter, namely that of our knowledge of other 
persona. 
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2. Our ~oowledae of Other Peraona 
We can know other people, in Merleau-Ponty'a view, becauae they 
have livina bodiea with the aaae atructurea and function• aa our own. 
"Io ao far aa I have aenaory functiona ••• I am already in 
coamunicatioo with othera taken aa aimilar paycho-pbyaical 
aubjecta. 1122 Aa we encounter another peraoo interactin& with objecta 
in the world which we thought were familiar only to ua, we are aware 
that tbia other bein& deala with the objecta in the aame way aa we 
do. Thia aimilar behavior awakena within ua a kind of echo. As 
Merleau-Ponty aaya: 
·•••Y body perceive• the body of another peraon, and 
diacovera in that other body a airaculoua prolongation o~3 my intenaiona, a familiar way of dealing with the world. 
We recognize other peraona in the aaae way aa we know ouraelvea, 
not by meana of an inferential proceaa, but by meana of a reaonance 
which we discern between their interaction with the world and our 
own. We are qualitatively alike. we do not experience each other aa 
objecta but aa subject• and agents, as living bodies inhabiting a 
c01D1Don world. Kerleau-Ponty maintain, that we experience other 
humane as part of a ahared reality, the other part of which we 
ourselves sake up. In fact, the tera 'part' is misleading in this 
context, since other human beinga and we cannot be separated from one 
another. lt would be better to speak of two dimensions of one 
phenomenon. 
As it ia the case with other things in the world and our own 
embodied aelvea, ao it ia alao with our knowledge of other persona in 
Merleau-Ponty'a epistemology. Aa I and the external world together 
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create a coamaoo epiatemic r eality, so alao _doea tbe body io relation 
to other embodied aelvea cr eate and auatain a ahared reality. In the 
previoua aection we considered the body'• relation to th i n&• in the 
wor ld and it waa mentioned that the body ia made up of the aame 
"at uff" as the world , that they share in the cOIIIDlonality of the 
" fleah." Furthentore, we noted that the relationship _ between the 
world and the body is li ke that between different parts of the body. 
Aa the various parts of the body fora an organic syn t hesis, so the 
body and the world constitute such a ayntheais. When Kerleau-Ponty 
speaks of our knowledae of ot her persona, he 1pecifically eaploya 
this particular analogy. For him, the body makes up a ayatea in 
co-operation with other bodies, not a mechanical system but a 
functional and oraanic one which presupposes a mutual understanding 
rather than seeking one. 
Henceforth, as the parts of my body together coapriae a 
system, so my body and the other peraon'a are one whole, 
two aides of one and .the same phenomenon, and the anonymous 
existence of which my body is the ever-renewed ~4ace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. 
The collllllunion we share with other people Kerleau-Ponty calls 
"interaubjectivity." The interaubjective world is created by tbe 
interaction aaongat embodied subjects who inhabit a c0111111on world and 
share a common fact of bein& linguistic beinas. In fact, for 
Merleau - Ponty, language is that which distinguishes other persons 
from sere living bodies, like aniaals. · By lan&uaae, of course, he 
does not mean simply "empirical lanauage," ·but linauiaticality · at its 
moat primordial level: gesturality. In other words, accordiD& to 
Merleau-Pon t y we experience persona aa persona primarily by their 
gestur al communication. In the aeaturea of otbera we encounter and 
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discern intentions like our own. 
The COJlllllunication or coaprehenaion of gestures comes about 
through the reciprocity of my intension• and the gestures 
of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible in the 
conduct of other people. It is aa if the 2~her person'• 
intentions inhabited my body and mine his. 
ln fact, if explicit, formal language was necessary to 
experience oth~rs aa persons, we would not think of very young 
children as persons, since they do not have t his type of language as 
yet. They are not, however, prelin&uistic, because they speak with 
their bodies; they kick and aqueeze, cry and amile. In a word, they 
participate in laoauage through geature. Converaely, if explicit, 
formal language waa aufficient to experience other• aa peraons, we 
would naturally think of computer• aa persona aince they excell at 
thia so r t of communication. Language, then, ia crucia l in 
Merleau-Ponty'a view for connecting human beings with each other in 
an intersubjective world. As Merleau-Ponty himself puts it: 
ln the experience of ~ialogue, there is constituted between 
the other person and myself a common ground, my thought and 
his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those 
of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the 
discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation 
of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual 
being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of 
behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in bis; we are 
collaborators for each other in the consW111Date reciprocity. 
Our perspectives merge igto each other, and we co-exist 
through a COllllllon world. 
The role of language in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, as the 
connection between human beings with the interaubjective world, and 
thus as the means of our knowledge of other · peraona as human, is 
explained by aichard Lanigan quite illuainatingly. Speaking, he 
aays, ia that which ll&kes us aware that the other is a conscious 
beioa. "Speaking eaergea a 'verbal gesticulation' which auggesta a 
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consciousneu -. 1127 Thoughts can never be made objective and public 
except through speech, understood broadly as gestural. thus ~ it is 
speech which aediates the hwaanness of other persons to ua and links 
ua to others as conscious, intentional beioas. Mallin ~&rees with 
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this point when he says: 1 ,. 
Others are available to us in the same way as we are aware 
of ourselves, as body-subjects, and the~r actions are given 
to us as structures, intentions, or manners of being in the 
world. Merleau-Ponty maintains that the smalleat movement 
by the other •28is given to us as a gesture, conduct, or 'c<aportment • ' 
Accordin, to Merleau-Ponty, we experience and know each other aa 
person s within the interaubjective world th r ough our comaon 
embodiment and langua&e as gesture, the latter naturally atemming 
from our bodily existence. Queations concerning the existence of 
other selves, which have plagued modern philosophy since Descartes, 
are actually a parasitic phenomenon in that they rest on the aelf-
evident or given character of the reality of other persona. Even to 
pose a question shows that another person's existence ia presupposed, 
aince someone must be there to provide an answer. A newly born baby 
shows by its behavior that other persons are given as real. A 
ten-day old baby alrady participates in human intersubjectivity by 
responding to and imitating the mother's smile, and a fifteen-month 
old child can participate in various gaaea, such as pretendin& to 
. ,9 bite another'• huger, or in playing "peek-a-boo." · such activities 
on the part of small children have firat order intersubjective 
significance. Children experience another person's saile and 
laughter as aoaethin& they, too, can do; they experience a 
primordial connection and c01111Ronality between themselves and other 
persons. they interact~ others.!! others. 
V 
., Between my consciouaneas and •Y body as I experience it, 
between this phenomenal body of mine and that of another aa 
I see it from the outside, there exists an internal 
relation which causes the other to appear as the coapletion 
of the syst em. The poaaibility of another perao,n' .a beina 
self-evident is owed to the fact that I aa not transparent 
to my~5lf, and that ay subjectivity draws its body in its 
wake. 
The relationship betwen myself and others ia like that between a 
river and a riverbed. The direction, width, and depth of the river 
ia determined by the riverbed, and yet it is just aa true to aay that 
the river determines the direction, width, and depth of the riverbed. 
Each is dependent on the other. So, too, do I and others aet our 
identity and character froa our autual interaction. We are like 
atatements in a dialoaue, each statement is a response to a previous 
one. A specific response is made only after one baa heard another 
pers on'• previous statement. One does not come with ready-aade 
responses to a dialogue. In the aaae way that each reaponse 
influences and gives rise to the next, ao too do land other persona 
influence and "conatitute" eacb .other. 31 We noticed in the previous 
section that language can influence and shape our experience of 
nonhuman objects in the world. The effecting power of language 1s 
even more obvioua with respect to human beinas. We are all familiar 
with the notion of a "aelf-fulfillin& prophecy;" if a child is 
called and treated aa a fast or slow learner repeatedly in achool and 
at home, she or be might very well become what these expectations 
call for. Therefore, language can be seen to have a atrona role to 
play in the conatruction of our knowledae of other persona, whether 
on the general or specific level :. Other persona and l are part of 
one and the aaae exiatential fabric, we ahare in the interaubject-
ivity of one cOlllllon human experience. 
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What exactly does Merleau-Ponty mean, when he apeaka of the 
interaubjective world? Aa I underatand it, this notion arises from 
his understandin& of the human subject aa embodied. He doe• not 
consider the huaan subject aa a ,elf-contained and independent aind 
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or soul installed within a body. bther, be speaks of the aind as t./ 
incarnated in the body. The body thus becoaes integral to the 
subject, rather than a "priaon houae" in which the subject reaides. 
Therefore, the human being ia a aubejct-object pbenOlllenon, neither a 
purely subjective nor a purely objective bein&• Aa such 
body-subjects interact they create a woven pattern of relationships 
which Merleau-Ponty terms "interaubjectivity." The subjects 
interlace with one another becauae they are mediated il each other 
rather than beina separated~ each other by their bodily 
dimension. In traditional thouaht bodies are generally thought of as 
aeparatina subjects fr0111 each other and cauain& us to think of 
knowing subjects as existin& i~dependently of one another. Ibis way 
of thinking gave rise to what in contemporary times ia called the 
problem of "other minds. 11 In Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, no problem 
of other minds arises, since other persona are not bidden within 
uninten~ional bodiea. 32 As Laurie Spurlin& COllllllents, the existence 
of others ia a given {act of our existence. We cannot get away froa 
others. 
Other people are a permanent hori&on to my existence, like 
a constant double at my aide. It ia the fact that my 
existence ia conatantly de-centered, since it is an 
interpla y between aenerality and individuality, between 
anonyaity and reflection, that I find the experience of the 
other.as I j§e neralized I," a potential in allay 
experience. 
The existence of others is not a question here because their 
bodies and our• toaether JUke each other known. I can only know 
myself in relation to other• and other• are known by ae in relation 
to me. If I can raiae the question of the existence of other 
peraona, I ■uat be as aware of them as I aa of myself. Thia is so 
because aaking questions is an activity which is learned tbrouab 
interaction with other speakers. If I know myself I ■ust know 
oth ers. An interaubjective world, then, is created by mean• of the 
interaction of intentional body-subjects whose phenomenal fields 
overlap and lntersect. Thia i• how kerleau-Ponty expressed it in the 
preface to his early major work: "The phenomenoloaical world is not 
pure being, but the sense which is revealed where the paths of my 
various experiences intersect. and also where my own and other 
people's intersect and engage each other like geara. 1134 
Since other selves and one's own self are qualitatively alike, 
the awareness of other persona poses no real problem. Since we 
become selves only in relation to others, it would seem strange even 
to ask bow we can know whether other selves exist. As kerleau-Ponty 
makes clear, for a child the reality of other pe~aona never arises; a 
child naturally takes up ita position in the world in relation to 
other persons. "The perception of other people and the 
intersubjective world are problematical only for adults. The child 
lives in a world which he unhesitat i ngly believes accessible to all 
around him. 1135 The "reality" of other persona is only a problem when 
one attempts to take an "objective" position in an abstract, 
at0111iatic apace, a position which, at the basic human level of 
existence, is impossible. In a deep sense, then, the knowledge of 
other persons is primordial within our embodied existence. 
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The .,not ton of sexuality in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty is an 
important topic to take up in connection with our discussion of the 
knowledge of other persona. Sexuality in this context is not limited 
to sexual relations in the narrow sense of the term. For 
Merleau-Ponty sexuality includes all of huaan affectivity. In 
traditional psychology, the emotions have frequently been regard~d as 
separate from the intellect, acti11& independently of other dimensions 
of human existence. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, thinks they are 
intimately connected with the other aspects of our being. Speaking 
specifically of sexuality, he says: 
Sexual life is one more form of original intentionality ••• 
sexuality is not an autonomoua cycle. It baa internal 
links with the whole active and cognitive being, theae ••• -
displaying one typical structure, and s~indi11& in relation 
to each other of reciprocal expression. 
We interact with each other through our c0111111onality as sexed, 
affective bein&s. Sexuality is our "openness" to others, as Barral 
put s it. 37 Since sexuality is _a torm of intentional~ty, "a general 
power, 1138 it ia not to be understood as a purely bodily instinct, but 
describes the human way of being-in-the-world. kerleau-Ponty 
connects affectiveness with other aspects ot our co111J11on life in order 
to exemplify how sexuality is a dimension of human inter-relations. 
For him, " ••• sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the 
routes, instruments or manifestationa of peraonal existence: the 
latter takes up and absolves into itself their exiatence as it is 
l . ,,39 anonymous y given. 
According to this interpretation, for Merleau-Ponty any 
awareness or knowledge ot others is grounded in human sexuality. 
Thia is so because interaubjectivity is dependent on human 
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aftectivene.a~, and this in turn ia anchored in our embodied way of 
beina-in-the~world. Human aexuality, like lin&uistic bein&, ariaea 
within and flows fr<llll the interaction between embodied, intentional 
aelvea in a phyaical and social context. Such interaction, in turn, 
provides both the basia for and the expreaaion of our knowledge of 
one another aa human persona. 
Moreover, in this affective re lat ionsbip aaona human b,iin&a, it 
is the individual body-subjects which gain the awarenesa of identity. 
In Merleau-Ponty'a thought there is a transformation from 
"consciouaneaa" to "aelf-consciousness." This process begins with 
"deaire. 1140 As the individual body-subjects interact with each 
other, they become aware of their differences as well as of their 
commonality. This create& a tension within their inter-
relationships. Each person, by recognizin& others through these 
difference&, also becomes aware of bia or her own diatinctivenesa. 
Ibis is how kallin aU111111.arizea the way in which individual self-
consciousness arises: 
••• in treating the other as a unique spatio-temporal 
clear in g, I bec0111e aware of a difference ••• between our 
clearings ••• Each begins to define himself as a 
person ••• througb expreasilf exchanges and emotional 
relations with the other. 
If in tact we all are, as persona, part of a c~Dlllon relational 
field or fabric, then it follows that with respect to the knowledge 
of others there can exist no epistemic gap between the knower and the 
known. If there were such a dichotomy between the self and other 
selves, it would be necessary and problematic to speak of two 
essentially different entities. Since, however, we get our identity 
and reality from our relationships to one another this poaaibility 
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never actu.a ll~ ariaea. Thus no diatance remain& between the knower 
and the known, according to Merleau-Ponty'a philoaophy, even and 
eap~cially wheD we conaider the knowled&e of other aelvea. 
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3. Our ~owledae of Ouraelvea 
Once aaain 1 would empbaaize that for Merleau-Ponty none of the 
three epiateaological categoriea, tbe world, other peraona, and tbe 
&elf, can be thought of aa independent of each other. All three are 
known in relation to each ot her, and ao any diacuaaion of any one of 
them must take place in the context of ita relation to the other two. 
Therefore, the following examination of Merleau-Ponty's view ot aelf 
knowledge muat bear thia relat _ionality in mind. i.ecall what Merleau-
Ponty himaelf aaid about thia mutual interdependence: 
There ia a relation ot active tranacendence between the 
aubject and the world. The world ia inseparable froa the 
subject, but from a aubject which ia nothina but a project 
of the world, and the subject ia inaeparable from
4
~he 
world, but froa a world which it project• itaelf. 
~nowlege of the aelt ia much ·aore myaterioua or ambiguoua for 
Merleau-Ponty than it waa for Deacartea. Although in~ aense 
Descartes may have been right in first trying to obtain aelf-
knowledge, he was also quite misguided in attempting, indeed in 
claiming to have arrived at, knowledge of the "pure" self, completely 
ap~rt from knowledge of the external world and other aelves. lie did 
not realize that our knowledge of the aelf ia molded in relation to 
other things and selves by meana of our interaction with thea. It 
ia, therefore, impoaaible to have initial and total acceas to a pure, 
"unadulterated" aelf without takin& the world and other peraona into 
account. In a word, it is impoaaible to gain any epiatemoloaical 
foothold in a vacuum, to have pure, abatract knowledge of anythin& 
wbataoever. 
One of the firat things which should be recalled and kept in 
-
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miud when diacuaain& our knowledge of ouraelvea ia the fact that for 
Merleau-Ponty the aelf ia not a conaciouaneaa or mind exiating 
independently of the body. The 1elf for Merleau-Ponty is, rather. 
always to be understood as incarnated; it is the body-aubject. The 
self is not, to be •~re, a body as an object among other objects, but 
aa a conscioua, intendin& body-aubject. ln Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy there is never a separation between the mind and the body; 
rather, the body is flooded by the mind and the mind is the axis of 
the body. The mind is a dimension of the self, as is the body, and 
thus neither can be referred to without at the same time referring to 
the se l f. It will be crucial to remeaber this multi-dimensional 
cha r acter of the aelf in the following diacuaaion in order to avoid 
any dualist i c assumptions. 
Furth naore, it is helpful to keep in mind that for Merleau-
Pon y th e e l f is not primitive. Thia meana that we do not arrive in 
the worl d s sel ·ea, as atomiatic "I"a. Children, for example, learn 
to use the pronoun 'I' only after they have learned to call 
themse lves by t heir name, as other people r ef er and speak to them. 
Frequent l y a child first calla herself by her own name, then ahe uses 
the objective case pronoun 'me,' and finally learns to use the 
subject case pronoun 11. 143 Thia pattern would se em to cor r espond to 
that of the development of the individual self. If the aelf is a 
developin& reality, it is clearly not primitive in nature. Spurling 
even remarks that "in the pre-objective, we cannot talk of a self. ,l+4 
For his part, Merleau-Ponty calla the 11111 "a field, an experience ••• & 
fresh possibility of situationa, 45 rather than a "self." 
It is poasible to consider the topic of self-knowledae in the 
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philosophy of Merleau-Ponty from three related angles. The first 
would be tbia: "Row ia aelf knowled&e related to one'• knowledae of 
one'• own body?" Secondly, "How does my relationship to other people 
affect ay knowledae of ayself?" Finally, "Ia my self-knowledae 
affected by my relationship to objects in the world around ae?" Let 
us take up these questions in their stated order. 
Fir st then, what of the relationahip between my self-knowledge 
and the awareneas of my own body? As was mentioned in Chapter One of 
the preaent work, in Mer le au-Ponty's view one's body creates a 
unified whole, a "synae s thetic, 1146 perceptual syste m in which the 
sensations of the various senaes can never be absolutely separated. 
In other words, it is impossible to isola t e the color of an object 
from. its texture and vice versa. The red in cherry juice, for 
instance, is very different from that in a plush rug. The color of 
an object, or any of its perceptual qualities, cannot be experienced 
independently of its other qua~i tiea. The picture of a casserole, to 
take another example, suggests ita taste, smell, and even its temper-
ature. In a similar way, a blind person can be said to "see" with 
the sense of touch and sound. 
Another aapect of the unified quality of our experience of our 
own body comes to light when we recall that our body can be said to 
e an "affective object" for us. When we are in pain, for example, 
we both.!:!.!!!, the pain in a particular place in our body and.!!!. in 
pain ourselves. Thus, the object of the pain and the subject of the 
pain are one and the same. Furthermore, the subject and object in 
question are not united as two separate entitie a , but as~• The 
affected and the affecting are identical. On the basis of this 
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affective unity it is easy to see that it is impossible for a gap to 
exist between the knower and the known with respect to the question 
of self-knowledge. In this case the subject and the object of 
knowledge are one and the same. 
It seems that at least in some sense Merleau-Ponty uses self-
knowledge, with its inherent impossibility for a subject-object 
dichotomy, as a paradigm for all human knowing. I do not mean to 
imply that he maintains that self-knowledge provides the basis for 
our knowledge of the world and other persons. Rather, I mean that in 
kerleau-Ponty's view our knowledge of things in the world and of 
other selves bears a structural similarity to our knowledge of 
ourselves, in that in each case the possibility for an epistemic gap 
to arise is undercut at the outset by the organic inter-connectedness 
of the mind, the body, and the world withi n the fabric of human 
existence. In some sense one could say that in Merleau-Ponty's 
epistemology the knower and the · known are -organically unified since 
together they constitute a single reality; they each receive their 
epistemic identity and s i gnificance from the other by means of their 
mutually interdependent interaction. 
The knowledge of the self, then, with respect to its epistemic 
unity, can be interpreted as the paradigm for all modes of knowing 
according to Merleau-Ponty. In our knowledge of others and of 
objects, that which is known and that which knows are ~nderstood as 
being in the same relationship to each other as the self is to itself 
in self-knowledge. It should be remembered that in Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy the world and other selves are understood as extensions of 
the body, which in turn is the incarnation of the self. Thus the 
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knower and tbe known in each caae are inextricably intertwined with 
each other; ·each ia experienced and known aa a part or aapect of the 
other. 
Now we ahall move on to the aecond conaideration within our 
overall topic for thia aection: bow doe• our knowledge of other 
buaan beings affect our knowledge of ouraelvea? According to 
Merleau-Ponty, there is a priaordial awareneaa of oneself which ia 
the condition for all other awareneaa. This prilllordial awareness can 
not be articulated, since it ia also the condition for articulation 
itself. Neither is it reflective, becauae it ia also the condition 
for reflectiveness. Both articulation and reflection preauppoae some 
form of self-awareness. Thus, although one is not aware of ihis 
prilllordial awareneas, it nevertheleaa is necessarily real because 
reflection and articulation take place. Mallin explain• Merleau-
Ponty'• view of th is primordial connection between the self and the 
world, includin& the self itself, in the following way: 
Since a first perception, that is to say, the taking notice 
of a particular and distinctive phenomenon, ia only 
possible through a rebalancin g of the body-subject'• 
general grasp, before the first perception one must be 
'alr~ady f~ work in a world' and spatially already 
acquired. 
Merleau - Ponty himself calla this primordial relationship to the 
. world "the most ancient pack. between 'x' and the world in general. 1148 
Mallin terms thia 'x' "a natural or captive self. 1149 There seema, 
then, to be a self - awareness which cannot be articulated but is tbe 
ground out of which any explicit awareness or knowledge of the aelf 
emerges. Thia primordial, pr~reflective awarenesa of 'x' ia the 
condition for an articulated knowledge of tbe self. 
In Pben0111enology _tl Perception Merleau-Ponty termed thia pre-
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reflective -.elf, or primordial "I," the "tacit c:ogito ... 5o Ou the 
other hand, he called the reflective self a ''verbal" or Napoken 
cogito," and claimed that the "I" spoken of by Descartes in hil 
Second Meditation was the la tt er. Mer le au- Ponty went on to say that 
t he verba l co&ito is only po s ibl e because of the tacit cogito. Here 
is how he put the mat ter: 
••• I shoul d find {words } not so much deriva t ive and 
inauthentic as meanin&lesa, and I should be unabl e even to 
read Descartea' book, were I not, before any spee ch can 
begin, in contact with my own life and thoug ht, and i f the 
spo~en syaito did not encounter within one a tacit 
cog1to. 
~any of Merleau-Ponty'a interpreters are ill-at-ease with the 
te rm " tacit cogito" when discusain& the poaaibility of the primordial 
se lf , because Merleau-Ponty biaaelf rejected the term i n his last 
wox-k, .!!!,!, Visible ~ .!.!!!, Invisible. ln the "Worki ng Notes" at th e 
end of this volume, Merleau - Ponty reminds the read er of how he 
originally talked of a primordial self - awareness in th e Phenomenol ogy 
of Perception: 
The cogito of Desca r t es •• • is an opera t ion on 
significations, a statement of relations betwe en them ••• It 
therefore presupposes a prereflective contact of self with 
self ••• or a tacit cogito ••• th i s is howl reasoned in 
Phenomenology .2,!, Perception, 132this correct? What I call the tacit cogito ia impossible. 
The reason, according to the "later Merleau-Ponty," for claiming 
to have been wrong in calling the primordial "I" a tacit cogito is 
that by de f inition cogitat i on can never be tacit in nature. 
Consciouaneaa, after all, can only be conacioua and thus explicit, 
while the notion of tacit awareneaa exclude• articulation. The 
expreaai on "tacit cogito" would seem to be a contradiction in terma. 
Thia is how Merleau-Ponty himself expreasea tbe problem: 
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·· To -have the idea of 'thinking,' ••• to aake the 'reduction,' 
te retu~n to . i.aimanence and to consciousnesa ••• it is 
necesaary to have words. It is by the combination of 
words ••• that I fora the transcendental attitude, that l 
constitute the conatitutive consciousness. 
Yet there is a world of silence, ••• ,~ order where 
there are non-lan.guage significations ••• 
Merleau-Ponty rejects the tacit coaito, at least in this note, then, 
because thinkiq (coaitation) can only take place in words and that 
which is tacit is neceaaarily iapoaaible to articulate. The "world 
of silence" cannot be referred to in terms of a tacit coaito. 
Samuel Mallin is one interpreter of Merleau-Ponty who disagrees 
with prevailin.g opinion, and with Mefleau-Ponty himself, concerning 
the rejection of the notion of a tacit cogito. According to Mallin, 
Merleau-Ponty ianored his own criticism and went on u&ill& the notion 
later on in the "Working Notes" themselves. For example, just a few 
pages after the above quotation Merleau-Ponty refers to the tacit 
cogito while discussing the nature of language. Although at this 
point he notes that in Phenomenology 2f Perception the concept of 
tacit cogito did not explain bow one moves from the silent cogito to 
the speaking cogito, he does not say that be was wrong in referring 
to the silent self as a cogito. Rather, he says that this way of 
speaking was incoaplete. 111 did not arrive at a aolution ••• on the 
.54 contrary I posed a problem." Merleau-Ponty continued to use the 
notion of the tacit cogito in the main text of The Visible ~ili, 
Invisible, which was written after the "Working Notes." Mallin 
thinks, therefore, that fortunately Merleau-Ponty did not take heed 
of his own criticism. 
Other interpreters of Merleau-Ponty, specifically bmy ~want, 
maintain, on the other hand, partly on the atren.gth of his aelf 
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criticism, that Merleau-Ponty not only rejected the notion of the 
tacit cogito, but much of the Pben011lenology .2f Perception aa well. 
Mallin stronaly diaagrees with thia interpretation. In an iaportant 
footnote in bis book Kerleau-Ponty'a Philosophy be atatea bis caae 
quite pointedly: 
Merleau-Ponty is much too bard on hi.maelf in these notea, 
for hia criticism applies, if at all, to aome noneaaential 
arguaenta on two or three pages of the Phenomenology of 
Perception where be aay have begun to slip into a Cartesian 
mode of description ••• Merleau-Ponty'a normal and intended 
use . o.f the e~presaion 't•c.i:t co&ito' in both texta ia just 
the oppoaite of a rationalist one ••• thea! 5particular notea are of little merit and very aialeadin&. 
For myaelf, l bad read through Merleau-Ponty'a discuasion of the 
tacit cogito in Phenomelogy .2f Perception without ever thinking that 
be fell into a rationalistic mode. On the contrary, l think be was 
very clear in abowing that the rationalistic interpretation of the 
cogito rests on the assumption of an unarticulated, prereflective 
awareneaa of the self which does not entail a consciousness in the 
Carteaian sense. In fact, since for Merleau-Pon~y all thought and 
langauge are grounded in and mediated by embodied interaction, such a 
tacit awareness of the self would seem both poasible and required. 
So, for Merleau-Ponty there would seem to be an awareneas of a 
primordial "I" which is not an awareness of an individual self, but 
which is, rather, an awarenesa of a self which is constituted aa part 
of the world and other persona. The French word "on" conveys the 
sense of such a tacit, universal self better than the English word 
"one." In En&liah, for example, we say "S0111eone is siagioa," while 
in French it is poaaible to say "On cbante." The French indefinite 
pronoun "on" is uaed to refer either to a person or to a group of 
peraona, while -the Enaliah world "one" refers exclusively to a single 
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. d' 'd 1 ·56 in 1v1 ua • · "On," therefore, ia aore helpful when apeaking of the 
tacit cogito · because the latter is a "universal 111 rather than a 
particular one, for Merleau-Ponty. 
As a nonindividuated self, operating at the "universal 111 level, 
interacts with other selves, it becomes aware of diatinctions uiona 
and between them and itself. Aa was mentioned in the previous 
section, both a commonality and a tension are created within , the 
relationship between the one and the many. Thus a self becomes aware 
that she or he is in some sense different or diatinct from the other 
objects and per1ons in the world. Differentiation, then, givea riae 
to a realization of individuality, a realization which ia reflected 
in the way a child developa froa referring to heraelf by her name to 
using the first person pronoun ''I." However, no matter how different 
a peraon may be from others, one is never totally diatinct, but 
remains a pole or dimension in a relational force-field. In fact, 
thia very individuality can o~ly ariae, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
within and aa a result ot such aymbiotic relationality. Othera 
provide the necessary condition for one's becoming and continuing as 
an individual self. Merleau-Ponty puts it poignantly: 
I am a field, an experience. One day, once and for all, 
aoaething was set in motion which, even during aleep, can 
no lonaer ceaae to see or not to see, to feel or not to 
feel, to suffer or be happy, to think or rest frOlll 
thinking, in a word to 'have it out' with the world. There 
then arose, not a new set of sensations or states of 
consciousness, not even a new monad or a new persepctive ••• 
there arose a fresh possibility & situationa ••• There was 
hencefo~th !7new settin&, the world received a freah layer of meaning. 
Other peraona have yet another role to play in the development 
of self-knowl _edge. It was mentioned earlier that the way in which we 
speak of and interact with other• affecta the way we know them. Now 
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let us focu ·• . on the other aide of this "aelf-fulfilliD& prophecy" 
pbenoaenon. Ibe way in which others talk to and treat ae also has a 
atro11& influence on the way I know myself. If a black person, for 
exaaple, is spoken to and interacted with as a "nigger," be or she 
mi &ht very well come to know biaaelf or herself•• one. Even tbe one 
who calla another person by such a name gets defined by this very 
act. A person'• self-identity grow• out of the dialectical 
relationships coaprising the environaeut, both soci a l and physical, 
into which they are cast. 
The third question that was posed at the beainnina of this 
s ection was this: Ia one's knowledae of oneself affected by objects 
in the world? In the first section of the present chapter we 
cona.idered our knowledge of what is often called "the external 
world," and it was mentioned that thiD&• do not exist independe tly 
i n an abstract space. ~ather, things in the world are alwa ys and 
only known in relationship, aa · tools in intersubjective apace. We 
also not ed that the world as such gets its identity from these 
rela t ion shi ps, as we ll. Things are, as it were, inhabited by us 
because they are in the space which is inhabited by our bodies. 
Furth ermore, . we inhabit the world because we are made of the same 
"stuff," both we and the world ar e "flesh." What, then, is the 
influence of our interaction with thin&• in the world on our 
knowledge of ourselves? 
Merleau-Ponty aoes so far as to say that" ••• a subject ia 
nothing but a project of the world. 1158 He maintains that aa I gaze 
at a thing in the world, the thing looks back at me. Further, aa I 
touch an object the object touches me back. Thia means that as I see 
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~n object froa a particular perapective, for example, thia 
perspectival aoale points to the place from which it is perceived. 
As l look at a cabinet, for instance, from the front, I am told that 
I am in fact in front of the cabinet. In addition, ay height ia 
coaaunicated to me by the objecta in the world. Aa I aee the top of 
a table rather than the bottom of it, I as told that I aa above the 
table, and so on. If I must constantly duck ay bead when going 
through doora, sit with my feet dangling off the floor, or buy 
specially large-sized clothea, I come to know myself as tall, short, 
or fat, respectively. Thu• much of what we know about ourselves 
results froa our interaction with objects in the world. 
It is perhaps easier to aee that aelf-k.nowledae is at least 
partly constituted by our relationship to the physical environment 
when we consider the life of a blind person. SiQce a blind peraon 
must rely more on the sense of touch and heari11&, the role of objects 
in the world in COlllllunicatioa one's whereabouta and identity seems 
somehow more obvious. When considering Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, 
it is really misleadi11&, however, to think this way, since for 
Merleau-Ponty seeing is interpreted as touch at a distance. When we 
observe a blind person walkin& down the street, we can easily see bow 
the environment tells that person where she or he is. It is 
essentially the same with those of us who are not blind, accordin& to 
Merleau-Ponty, for we are "in touch" with the world through our ga&e. 
What we see, as well as what we bear, feel, and smell, is our way of 
knowin& how and where we are located. 
We realize, then, that in Kerleau-Ponty'a epistemology we coae 
to know ourselves in relation to objects and other persona as we 
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interact ·'with them. Becauae of the organic character of this 
interaction, th ere is no room for a gap between the knower and the 
known. The self knows itself in and through its knowledge of other 
things and persons. Al10, between the body-subject and the world of 
things there is no epistemic diatance to be overcome, because the two 
are constantly involved in a aymbiotic interdependency. Our 
relationship with the world is, for Merleau-Ponty, similar to that of 
the parts of our body to the body itself. 
finally, no &•P between the knower and the known is possible 
with respect to the body-subject and other body-subjects. The 
subject and other persona create and exist within an interaubjective 
world, a world which is presupposed by the very process of callin& it 
into question. Other persons are always a dimension of ayaelf, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, and ~ versa, as well. The "universal 
111 never truly disappear,. Although one becomes an individual, this 
indivudality remains within the intersubjective world, auatained by 
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CONCLUSION 
Has Kerleau-Ponty, then, resolved the problea of the subject-
object dichotomy? It seems to me that he bas by conatruin& the 
knower as the body-subject. At the very least, he baa provided a 
way of approaching the problem which bolds much pr01Dise for 
dismantling it before it can do its damage. The dichotomy is 
created by first separatin& the knowing subject from the object of 
knowing. Ibis separation stems from conceiving the mind as the sole 
source and basis of knowledge, thereby cutting it off from the world 
and other minds. In Merleau-Ponty's epistemology, the knowing 
subject is not a disembodied mind, but a mind incarnated, a body 
which is an intentional subject. No epistemic gap can exist between 
the knower and the known, whether the latter be the self, the world, 
or other persona, because in each case the realities involved exist 
within and constitute an organic unity which allows for no cognitive 
distance between mind and body. Our bodies are interlaced with 
those of other persons in such a way as to eliminate the possibility 
of a gap between ourselves and others, epistemically speaking. In 
like manner, our b0<1ies and the objects of the worla are of "one 
flesh," they inhabit each other, and are extensions of each other. 
The epistemological problem of the subject-object dichot0111y has 
been resolvea by Kerleau-Ponty by viewing the body at the outset aa 
an intentional, active knower. The problem arose from a dualism 
which separatea the mind from the body and regarded the body as an 
object among other objects. By rejecting mind-body dualism, and by 
understanding the world and others as intimately connected with the 
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body-subject -, the traditional subject-object dichotomy, the distance 
between the knower and the known, is overcome. 
Let me conclude by indicating some areas which warrant, even 
demand, further exploration and scrutiny in Merleau-Ponty's 
epistemology. For while it seems to me that be has provided an 
excellent point of departure, as well as some promising guidelines, 
for the construction of a fresh and highly fruitful post-Cartesian 
philosophy, a good deal of work remains to be done. 
One area of particular importance would be the relationship 
between Merleau-Ponty's epistemology and the familiar contemporary 
distinction between "knowing bow" and "knowing ~-" It is 
frequently claimed that phenomenoloaical analyses, auch aa that of 
Merleau-Ponty, may provide a f i ne account of the psychology of how 
we came to know, but they have no bearing on the philosophical issue 
of what constitutes knowledge in the propositional senae. Just what 
is the connection between Merl~a u-Ponty's redefinition of the role 
of the body and cognitive, reflective knowledge? Michael Polanyi is 
one thinker who has sought to draw on Merleau-Ponty's work in the 
development of what he calls "a post-critical epistemology. 111 
.•. 
Another area for f urther study would be the implications of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language. Of special interest here is 
the sense and degree to which the bi-polar characterization of 
experience and language entails a specific view of the origin and 
structure of linguistic activity. Is there a sense in which human 
language is autonymous or is it essentially a function of social 
interaction? The investigations of the later Wittgenstein would 
seem relevant here, and both Laurie Spurling 2 and Nicholas Gier 3 
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have explored these possibilities. 
Finally, a discussion of the implications of Merleau-Ponty's 
relational epistemology for metaphysics would be a very worthwhile 
endeavor. Initially there would seem to be certain natural points 
of contact between the notions of the symbiotic interdependence and 
the developmental character of the self, on the one band, and the 
process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, on the other hand. 
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